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During the winter of 1944, two Russian armies encircled two German corps on the Dnieper River.

The Germans

managed to break out of the encirclement after an attempt
to relieve them failed.

The battle lasted only three

weeks, but cost both sides greatly.

Both sides carried

out a successful airlift to keep their troops in action.
The Germans carried out a brilliant campaign, while the
Russians demonstrated that they still needed to perfect
their encirclement doctrine and their propaganda.
Each side was hindered by its leaders.

Hitler

forced the Germans to hold ground, while Stalin forced
his generals to fight a battle they should not have
fought.

Both men failed to follow military doctrine, and

ignored the larger picture of the war.
Both sides won, and both sides lost.

the Germans

recovered their men, but lost ground and the use of the
divisions used in the operations for a time.

the Rus-

sians drove the Germans off the Dnieper, but failed to
capitalize on the gains they made.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Keil und Kessel
The Technique in Practice
During World War II, the German Panzerwaffe developed a technique they called "keil und kessel".

In this

two phase operation they stormed through the lines of
their enemies, and encircled large portions of the enemy
army.
In the "keil" or wedge stage of the operation, the
German troops drove through the enemy lines on a small
scale.

Follow up tank and motorized infantry forces

drove into the gap to add their numbers to the spearhead
and to hold the breach in the enemy lines open.

German

air force stuka dive bombers acted as the artillery for
the tank troops, by diving in on targets, such as fortifications or gun emplacements designated by the tank commanders.

The stukas destroyed the line of fortifications

or enemy guns before the German tanks reached them.
In the "kessel" or cauldron stage of the operation,
the German troops split into two groups after entering
1

2

the enemy lines and encircled large numbers of enemy
troops.

Follow up troops pouring through the gap in the

enemy lines sought to keep the encircled troops from
breaking out of the cauldron and allowed the troops of
the spearhead to continue to drive into the interior of
the enemy country.
The Germans made good use of this technique during
their conquest of Poland and later during their conquest
of France.

To a greater extent, the Germans made use of

the technique in their campaign against Russia.

The

Germans managed to encircle hundreds of thousands of
Russian troops irt their cauldrons and introduced to the
world this new technique for armored warfare.
The Russians Learn
Unfortunately for the Germans, the Russians learned
the keil und kessel techniques all too well.

When the

Russians finally gained overwhelming superiority over
the Germans in all types of equipment and men, the
Russians began trapping the German armies in cauldrons
of their

own.

Later in the war, the American and

British armies trapped the German armies in cauldrons of
their own.

3

Hitler at Fault
One might believe that the army that developed the
new technique would not allow themselves to be trapped in
their own trap.

The fault for falling into the cauldrons

rarely lay with the German generals.

Most of the time

Hitler was to blame, by forcing his armies to hold the
ground they .were on, even while the enemy armies were
moving to encircle them.
In the last months of 1942, Hitler ordered Sixth
Army to stay in Stalingrad, while Russian armies moved to
encircle them.

During the beginning of the encirclement,

the German generals believed they might have had a chance
to escape, but the longer Hitler forced them to stay in
the city, they lost hope of a successful escape, as their
supplies and ammunition dwindled.

Sixth Army ceased to

exist in early 1943, when the Russians finally forced the
remnants of the army to surrender.
The Dilemma at Cherkassy-Korsun
At Cherkassy, in 1944, Army Group South faced a
situation similar to the one Sixth Army faced just a year
earlier at Stalingrad.

The Russians began encircling a

group of German troops on the Dnieper River, and the
German generals of Army Group South went to Hitler to get
permission for them to withdraw.

Hitler would not

4

listen, and a new disaster began to overtake the men of
Army Group South.

The men of the two German corps

encircled at Cherkassy began their many days of suffering
because Hitler wanted to hold the land they were on.
Hitler cause the German disaster at Cherkassy by not
listening to his generals when they told him to withdraw,
but the German generals were able to lessen the disaster
through their tenacity, and because of ineptness on the
part of the Russians encircling the troops at Cherkassy.

CHAPTER II
RETREAT TO THE DNIEPER
December 1943-January 1944
Withdrawal Behind the River
The story of the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket begins not
on the night the Russians formed the pocket, but with the
German withdrawal to the Dnieper River Line.

Army Group

South had staved off the main Russian offensives throughout the war in Russia and had paid dearly for their successes.

Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, the commander

of Army Group South, continuously argued that he needed
more infantry and armored divisions to hold the Dnieper
Line, or he would have to give up the river.

He wanted

permission to withdraw to a shorter line on the Bug
River.

Hitler argued that he must hold the Dnieper

River, or that the Russians would cut Army Group A off
in the Crimea.

The fact that Hitler insisted on holding

the river and would not listen to the requests von
Manstein put before him, led to the crisis on the Dnieper
River that culminated in the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket.
According to von Manstein, his army group might have

5

6

held the Russians off at the Dnieper River for a period
of time.

His chances would have been better though, if

Hitler had allowed the fortification of the Dnieper River
Line to continue during the Autumn of 1943.

But, Hitler

felt that his commanders would fall back to the fixed
fortifications as soon as they were finished, surrendering all the territory on the eastern bank of the river to
the Russians.

So, instead of falling back to a defend-

able line, von Manstein withdrew behind a river with very
few fortifications, and his men had to dig in, in order
to have any chance of holding the river. 1
Unfortunately for von Manstein, and the other commanders on the Russian Front, Hitler decided that he
should

make most of the decisions concerning the German

Army for himself.

He not only made the strategic deci-

sions that affected the whole front, but the tactical
decisions for armies that were hundreds of miles away as
well. 2
A second problem for von Manstein lay in the fact
that his army group needed to hold a front of 440 miles.
In order to hold a front that long his divisions would
need to stretch themselves to the limit.

He had a total

of thirty-seven infantry divisions to hold the front. 3
His infantry divisions were each responsible for a front
of twelve miles.

At full strength, this would not have

been a problem, but each of the divisions had a front

7

line fighting strength of only 1,000 men.

This meant

that von Manstein needed to hold the front assigned to
his army group with an average of only 83 men per mile. 4
According to von Manstein, Hitler expected the units
of Army Group South to hold entirely too much territory.
The Russians had battered his four armies, and each retained only a fraction of it's total fighting strength.
None of the divisions of Army Group South had been out of
the front line long enough for a total refit.

The army

group's equipment was not in tip top condition, and the
men were tired from weeks in the front lines.

Von

Manstein sent a message to the high command informing
them of his situation, and asking for help to hold his
front. 5
Von Manstein argued that he must use the panzer and
panzer grenadier divisions available to his army to pinch
off the Russian armored breakthroughs, not hold territory.

He wanted his tanks as a mobile reserve that he

could send wherever they were needed.

He argued that he

could not tie his armored units down to the land, that
they were at their most dangerous when on the move. 6
Major General F.W. von Mellenthin, chief of staff for von
Manstein, referred to this as an elastic defense theory.
The Russians would break the German lines, but the panzer
divisions would seal the breakthrough off and restore the
original front. 7

Von Manstein believed that even though

8

his armored divisions were very weak that they could
provide the punch needed to at least stop the Russian
spearheads.

He could then use his infantry to contain

the armored columns, and defeat the Russians where they
stood.

Army Group South did not possess enough tanks to

distribute them among the infantry divisions, and still
have enough tanks left over to fight off strong Russian
attacks. 8
Hitler disagreed with von Manstein and ordered him
to use the armored elements of his armies, as well as the
infantry to hold key bridgeheads on the eastern bank of
the Dnieper.

Hitler hoped that the Russians would not

attack his lines while the armored elements of his armies
still held these key points.

He felt that while his

armies still held the bridgeheads they used to attack
Russia in prior years, that the Russians would believe
that the German Army might still have one offensive
left. 9
Von Manstein informed the OberKornmando der Wermacht,
high command of the armed forces, that Army Group South
held their front of 440 miles with thirty-seven infantry,
and seventeen armored divisions.

He went on to state

that without several more follow up infantry divisions
(more than the three that were on their way) that he
could not hold the front against an organized Russian

9

attack.

He also argued that Army Group South should

receive the most new equipment, since at the time they
were bearing the brunt of the fighting in the east. 10
Instead of sending von Manstein more divisions,
Hitler sent him his best wishes, and an experimental
weapon .

During the time Army Group South retreated to

the Dnieper, the Germans began experiments mounting a
twenty to thirty millimeter cannon on a Junkers JU. 87
and 88 for hunting tanks.

The experiments on the JU. 88

came to naught, but the Germans finally succeeded in
mounting twin thirty-seven millimeter cannons on the JU.
87's.

Colonel Hans Rudel, at that time on convalescent

leave, first tested the plane.

He liked the plane, and

took it with him back to his squadron.

As one of the

highest scoring aces in a Ju. 87, he was accorded the
honor of first flying the cannon plane in combat.

His

group was put under command of Army Group South to help
stabilize the situation on the Dnieper River. 11
Army Group South now faced the Russians on a river
line, but each day brought new Russian forces within
striking distance of the German lines.

Three armies com-

prising twenty rifle and two tank or mechanized corps
faced First Panzer Army.

Two armies of fifteen divisions

and one tank army of two tank and one mechanized corps
advanced on the Dnieper between Dnepropetrovsk and

10

Kremenchug.

Two armies of twelve rifle divisions, two

tank and one mechanized corps were moving towards the
Dnieper between Cherkassy and Rzhishchev.

Theses two

armies were followed by a tank army of three more armored
corps.u
A Conference With Hitler
On December 27, 1943, von Manstein left for a conference with Hitler, hoping to convince Hitler of the
need to withdraw his forces from the huge bend in the
Dnieper River.

Von Manstein also suggested that Hitler

allow the evacuation of Nikopol.

The limited withdrawal,

and the evacuation of the town that he proposed would
have shortened his front by 125 miles.

Hitler refused to

listen to von Manstein's suggestion citing that if he
allowed the withdrawal, the Russians would concentrate
against the Crimea.

Hitler felt that the loss of the

Crimea would seriously hinder relations with Rumania and
Turkey.

At this point, General Zietzler, one of Hitler's

advisors, pointed out that the Crimea would eventually be
lost anyway and that relations with Turkey and Rumania
were on shaky ground as it was. 8
Von Manstein then brought up the subject of German
de-fensive strategy and questioned the wisdom of forcing
the German troops on the Eastern Front to hold the land

11

they stood on.

He also questioned the practice of

turning surrounded cities into fortresses.

Hitler re-

torted that the Russians must lose steam soon and that
retreating would only force the Germans to conquer more
land when they took the offensive again.

He then defend-

ed his practice of declaring fortress cities by saying:
Just wait and see. We've lived through a couple of those cases when everybody said things
were beyond repair.
Later it turned out that
things could be brought under control after
all.
Now, I am worrying myself sick for having
given permission for retreats in the past.~
Hitler never really answered the questions brought up at
the meeting, he only generalized about past successes and
never addressed the problems his generals brought up.
Hitler would continue to force the German troops to hold
on to untenable ground.

Von Manstein left the conference

not being able to secure a better situation for his
troops . 15
New Russian Offensives
At the end of 1943, the Russians began operations to
cross the Dnieper River.

Thousands of Russian troops

rowed or paddled small crafts across the river.

Others

rode on improvised rafts made of barrels, planks or
benches they strung together.

Russian artillery stood by

on the east bank of the river to deal with any serious
German resistance. 16

12

Near Kiev, in several places, the Russians puttied
up the openings on sixty of their tanks and sent them
under the water.

Two brigades of paratroopers were drop-

ped in to reinforce the infantry and tanks.

General

Colonel Vatutin managed to hold most of these bridgeheads
and even managed to merge a few of them into one large
one. 17
General Colonel Koniev set up no less than eighteen
bridgeheads in this fashion.

In the first few days of

their existence, he lost seven of them though with very
heavy casualties.

Koniev did manage to merge eleven of

his bridgeheads into one large one.

As soon as he estab-

lished this large bridgehead the Germans attacked it by
air, but Russian fighters managed to drive the German
fighters off before they caused any serious casualties
within the bridgehead. 18
Throughout January, the Russians attacked the front
of Army Group South relentlessly.

Because of Hitler's

orders, at times, the German armies needed to hold not
only the river front, but their flanks, as they protected
the bridgeheads on the Dnieper that Hitler demanded held.
Sixth Panzer Army held the Dnieper Front, as well as the
Nikopol Bridgehead to their south, which in actuality
belonged to Army Group A. 19
Von Manstein was not the only commander in his army

13

group that felt the task assigned his men was unreasonable.

The commander of Eighth Army, Colonel General

Wohler, sent urgent messages to von Manstein, expressing
grave doubts about continuing to hold the curving line of
positions northwest of Kirovograd to which he must commit
an excessive number of men.

He recommended withdrawal of

the interior flanks of Eighth Army and First Panzer Army
by retirement to successive positions, first behind the
Olshanka-Ross River Line, and eventually to the line
Shpola-Zvenigorodka-Gniloy Tikich Stream.

Hitler denied

permission for the withdrawal citing the need to hold the
salient for future offensive operations in the direction
of Kiev. 20
At this time, Colonel General Wohler found himself
with an overextended army short of reserves available to
carry on an active defense.

The armored elements of two

panzer divisions formed the only true reserves available
to Eighth Army.

All of the divisions in the army were

all well under strength, and therefore no division could
count on another to ease the pressure on their front.
After Hitler's refusal to withdraw, Wohler informed von
Manstein that if the Russians kept up pressure on his
front that he could not hold without new forces or a
shorter front. 21

14

Russian Breakthroughs
The order to stay on the Dnieper River line also
caused von Manstein trouble on the northern wing of his
front.

Fourth Panzer Army withdrew from Berdichev after

intensive enemy pressure.

Fourth Panzer Army withdrew

further west and southwest in order to preserve some sort
of continuity between the elements of the army. 22

The

Fifty-Ninth Corps, at this time very weak from so long at
the front, alone made a fighting withdrawal toward
Rovno. 23

The Russians launched an attack towards Rovno

with Sixtieth and Thirteenth armies.~
At a conference with Hitler, von Manstein brought up
the need for the appointment of a commander-in-chief for
the Eastern Front.

Von Manstein argued that a commander-

in-chief had already been appointed for the Italian Theatre and for the Western Front, but that Hitler had never
appointed a military man to command the forces of the
Eastern Front.
commanders

Hitler then commented that none of the

on the Eastern Front obeyed his commands.

He

then asked if von Manstein expected the commanders to
obey a mere field marshall.

Von Manstein retorted that

he had always obeyed Hitler's commands.

Unfortunately

for von Manstein, the argument ended here, without the
appointment of a military commander-in-chief.

Hitler

then dismissed von Manstein, and ordered him to hold his

15

lines, ordering him not to give up any more land.~
During the morning on January 5, General Koniev
launched his Second Ukrainian Front in a massive attack
against the German lines near Kirovograd.

Koniev had

been on the defensive since December 20, while waiting
for the reinforcements that Stavka had ordered for him.
Since the twentieth he had received 300 tanks and 100
self propelled guns.

The Russians hoped that Koniev

could break through the German Front, and ravage the rear
of the German forces in the Kirovograd-Pervomaisk area. 26
The Russians launched their attack at 0600 jumping
off from two principal concentration areas.

The attacks

were preceded by half an hour's artillery preparation and
several air strikes.

Massed infantry then poured through

the gaps the artillery and air strikes created in the
German lines.

Follow up infantry and anti-tank units

widened the breaches in the German lines and secured the
flanks for the advancing Russian armor. n
By the time the infantry attack began, the Russian
fire had destroyed most of the German artillery batteries.

The continuous fire also inflicted heavy casualties

on the German forces in the area of the artillery barrage.

The divisions covering the front facing the Rus-

sian attack were further reduced in fighting strength.
Before the offensive began, Second Parachute Division

16

held a twelve mile front with 3,200 men.
Panzer Grenadier Division held
3,700 men.

The Tenth

an eleven mile front with

The Russians attacked these two divisions

with seven infantry divisions supported by armored
groups.

The Russians managed an advance of six miles on

a four mile front.

On the northern sector of

their at-

tack, the Russians hit the Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps,
and advanced thirteen miles on a ten mile front. 28
The Russian armored forces then attempted to exploit
their breakthroughs, mainly in the south on the front of
the Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps.

The German corps reserve

im-mediately counterattacked, and with heavy anti-tank
support, managed to destroy ninety some tanks in the process.

The Germans estimated that they managed to contain

two-hundred enemy tanks with their counterattacks and
anti-tank gun concentrations.

After stopping the initial

Russian penetration in the north, Tenth Panzer Division
reported the loss of 620 men in one day, while destroying
153 enemy tanks.

However, it quickly became evident that

the forces of Eighth Army could not contain the breakthroughs on the northern wing of their front alone.
Colonel General Wohler sent desperate pleas for help to
Army Group South. 29

17

The Impending Disaster
Von Manstein answered the request for help by transferring the Third Panzer Division to the Forty-Seventh
Panzer Corps.

The Third Panzer Division sought to help

the Eleventh Panzer Division stop the Russian armored
forces driving southwest.

This enemy thrust threatened

to envelop Kirovograd from the north and west.

The Ger-

mans feared the loss of Kirovograd because all their supply lines to Army Group A, and the southern wing of Army
Group South went through or close to the town. 30
During his attack on Kirovograd, Koniev received new
instructions from Marshall Zhukov, to launch a secondary
attack with the objective of reaching Uman.

This oper-

ation, conducted jointly with General Vatutin, sought to
create a pocket of German soldiers in the Kanev-Zvenigorodka-Uman area.

Koniev assigned the Fifty-Second and

Fifty-Third Armies to the secondary operation against
Uman. 31
On January 6, the Russians pierced the front of Army
Group South between First Panzer Army and the right wing
of Fourth Panzer Army.

The Russians stopped just after

piercing the army group front in order to exploit the exposed flanks of Fourth Panzer Army, hoping to destroy the
army. 32

The Russians sought to demolish Fourth Panzer Ar-

my with three armies:

the Eighteenth, First Guards and
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First

Guards Tanks Army. 33
Koniev launched his attack on Uman between the First

Panzer Army and Fourth Panzer Army.

The First Tank Army

and Fortieth Army drove southward, their spearheads
reached a point only twenty miles from Uman, threatening
the supply base of First Panzer Army.

The Russians also

closed on Vinnitsa, where Army Group South Headquarters
had previous-ly been located.

The Russians managed to

block the German railhead at Zhmerinka temporarily.~
Koniev's attack against Kirovograd met with success
right away.

On the night of January 7, General

Kirichenko's Twenty-Ninth Tank Corps (part of the Fifth
Guards Tank Army) broke into the southern suburbs of
Kirovograd, followed closely by two rifle divisions.

At

0900, the following morning, Russian forces cut the
Kirovograd-Novo Ukrainka road and railway line, cutting
the Germans in the town off from supply.

During the

morning, the Eighteenth Tank Corps swept around the town,
and attacked the German def enders from the south. 35
Kirovograd Encircled
Major General Fritz Bayerlein, the commander of the
Third Panzer Division had his headquarters in Kirovograd,
during the time of the Russian attack on the town.
divisional history quotes him as saying:

The

"We've got to
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get out, Kirovograd sounds too much like Stalingrad to
me". 36

His communications section had been decimated dur-

ing a Russian artillery bombardment, and his division
never received the order turning Kirovograd into a fortress city. 37
Bayerlein called the rest of the commanders in the
city together, and outlined his plans to escape from the
city.

The other commanders agreed with him in principle,

but would not disobey the order from Hitler turning the
city into a fortress.

Bayerlein stressed the fact that a

panzer division was a mobile formation, and could not be
tied to a city, and forced to fight a static battle. 38
Bayerlein arranged for the Tenth Panzer Grenadier
Division to occupy the line his division held.

He then

formed his division, and gave the order to attack northward.

His division broke through the Russian lines, and

drove northward, until they finally made contact with elements of the Eleventh Panzer Division.~
Orders from von Manstein placed the Third Panzer Division under the control of Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps.
After fighting their way out of the encirclement, Third
Panzer Division turned around, and attacked the Russian
flank, in support of Forty-Seventh Panzer Division's attempt to free the rest of the men encircled in
Kirovograd.

His units received no rest, and spent the
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ensuing days attacking real and imagined enemy positions
around the city. 40
The Sixty-Seventh Tank Brigade of Rotmistrov's Fifth
Guards Tank Army burst through the lines of Forty-seventh
Panzer Corps, and attacked the headquarters unit in
Malaya Viska.

Nikolaus Von Vormann, and the elements of

his headquarters unit barely escaped from the city.

Von

Vormann's adjutant, Major Maase, organized the rear guard
action of the headquarters unit, and fought to the death
in order that his commander survive. 41
After leaving the town in flames, the Sixty-Seventh
Tank Brigade struck the airfield of Lieutenant Colonel
Hans Rudel's Immelmann squadron. Rudel, at that time on a
mission with his squadron escaped destruction at the
hands of the Russians.

Upon their return to the base,

his squadron chased the Soviet tanks across the Russians
hinterland.

The tanks he did not destroy himself, he

drove into the tank busting parties of the Forty-seventh
Panzer Corps, none of the Russian tanks survived the
encounter.

Few of the tankers survived the attack to

tell of the disaster they faced on the steppes.

Rudel

destroyed seventeen tanks and seven assault guns on his
own. 42
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The Battle for the City
Colonel General Wohler of Eighth Army managed to set
up a cohesive front, and began attacks to free the men
surrounded at Kirovograd.

In his effort to destroy the

Russian forces facing his army, he received a great deal
of help from the Luftwaffe field divisions.

A detachment

of the Forty-Third Flak Regiment destroyed thirty-three
Russian tanks during a six hour period on January 9,
blunting a Russian attack.

The Russians launched a

second attack against the men of the Forty-Third Flak
Regiment, which ended in a Russian retreat, leaving
forty-one more T-34's burning on the field.~
By January 9, the Third Panzer Division under Major
General Bayerlein, had reached a point only nine miles
from Kirovograd.

Koniev's armored elements had become

more and more dispersed, making them more vulnerable to
swift counterattacks by German forces.

The success of

the attack by Bayerlein forced Koniev to divert forces
from his encircling ring around the city, to stop
Bayerlein's advance.~
On January 9, elements of the 331st Regimental Group
of the 167th Infantry Division had battled their way into
the village of Gruzskoye, only seven miles west of
Kirovograd.

The infantrymen dug in for the night, plan-

ning to continue their attack against the Russians in the
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morning.

Before they could bed down for the night, or-

ders came to them that they continue their attack to
reach Kirovograd during the night.~
During the whole of the encirclement, Colonel General Wohler and Major General von Vormann had pleaded
with Hitler to release the men of Kirovograd, and let
them withdraw from the city.

Their pleas met with suc-

cess, and Hitler ordered the three divisions in the fortress to break out during the night on January 9.

The

Russians west of the pocket were caught in a vice between
the three divisions breaking out of the pocket, and the
men of the 331st Regimental Group who had launched a
night attack to free the men in the pocket.~
According to Lieutenant General August Schmidt of
the Tenth Panzer Grenadier Division, only one enemy tank
attempted to stop the breakout, and it was unsuccessful.
His division managed to bring out all their wounded, and
all their weapons.

The Germans of the Tenth Panzer

Grenadier Division left no weapons for the Russians, and
according to Schmidt, the story was the same with the
rest of the divisions in the pocket.

The Russians moved

in the next day, and occupied the town, ending the German
bid to hold on to Kirovograd.~
After Koniev met with his ''success" in Kirovograd,
Vatutin decided that he needed to submit an adjustment of
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his own plans to stavka.

Vatutin sent his plans which

contained the following ideas to stavka:
Right wing: move up to the River Goryn, and on
to Slutsk, Dubrovitsa and Sarny. Center and
Left: Eliminate German concentrations in the
Zhmerinka and Uman area, and to take Vinnitsa,
Zhmer ika and Uman. 48
Stavka approved of the changes Vatutin desired and authorized him to implement them.

But, Stavka could pro-

vide no further reinforcements at the time. 49
Continuing Russian Offensives
On the northern wing of the First Ukrainian Front,
Vatutin managed to push General Pukhov's Thirteenth Army
on to Sarny.

Forward elements of the army reached the

Goryn and styr Rivers by January 12.

General

Chernyakhovskii's Sixtieth Army drove for Shepetovka, but
after initially making headway ran into stiff resistance.
General Pukhov also began running into stiff resistance
soon after reaching the rivers.

Both armies met German

defenders dug into protected river lines, whose flanks
were protected by other trench lines and soldiers in defensive positions in ravines.

The ruggedness of the land

negated the Russian tank superiority and allowed the
German infantry to face the Russians on their own terms. 50
The stiffening German resistance forced Vatutin to
bring his First Ukrainian Front to a halt.

Fighting had
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spread his armies over a distance of 300 miles.

The mov-

ement on the left wing, which had advanced more rapidly
than the rest of the army, created a large gap in
Vatutin's front.
anized corps

At Zhmerinka, the Eighth Guards Mech-

(of the First Tank Army) became cut off by

a German counter-thrust.

Vatutin cited lack of fuel and

supplies and the need to reestablish a cohesive front as
the reasons he ordered the halt. 51
German Reactions
Von Manstein believed he possessed enough forces to
tackle one of the breakthroughs at a time, and chose to
tackle the breakthrough between First Panzer Army and
Fourth Panzer Army first.

He chose this course of action

because if this spearhead reached the upper reaches of
the Bug River, the Russians stood a good chance of cutting off Sixth Army and Eighth Army entirely. 52
On January 12, Stavka issued orders to Vatutin and
Koniev to wipe out the German salient at ZvenigorodMironovka.

In order to achieve the liquidation of the

salient, Vatutin and Koniev had to bring their flanks together at Shpola.

If successful, the junction of the two

fronts would have put the Russians in a good position to
launch a new offensive to attain the southern part of the
Bug River.B
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Neither Vatutin or Koniev could make headway against
the German salient in the Cherkassy-Korsun area.

The

Germans used the hills and gullies in the area to set up
a viable defense against the Russian infantry.

The area

was not well suited for tanks, and the Russian armored
forces caused only slight problems for the Germans in the
area. 54
Hitler hoped to stop the Russians on the Dnieper
River for another year.

He believed that if the Russians

broke through the German lines on the Dnieper, that the
Russian offensive would peter out as the other offensives
had in the past.

According to Colonel General Walter

Warlimont, Hitler desired that the Russians should break
through on the front of Army Group South.
Hitler:
"It is rather to be hoped that the
enemy will try to break through between
Cherkassy and Kirovograd and thereby finally
exhaust himself. 1155
Warlimont could not figure out why Hitler hoped the
Russians would break through on any front.

He also

questioned as to why the Russians would choose the front
of Army Group South for their breakthrough when they
could achieve the same end just as easily on the fronts
of the other two army groups. 56
Hitler felt it necessary that the Germans hold on to
the bridgeheads they held at Cherkassy and Nikopol on the
Dnieper River.

He felt that the bridgehead at Nikopol
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held strategic importance even at this point of the war.
He still felt that his armies were capable of carrying
out an offensive, which he planned to launch from
Nikopol.

He wanted Nikopol held at all costs because he

felt that even if he would not carry out an offensive
soon, that as long as the Germans held the bridgehead,
the Russians would not feel safe attacking on the army
group front.

The Russians would also tie down consid-

erable forces keeping the Germans in the bridgehead, and
guarding against future German offenses. 57
The Dnieper in Retrospect
Many of the predictions Hitler's generals made upon
reaching the Dnieper River came true.

Von Manstein and

later the generals of Army Group South came to the conclusion that they had no chance of holding on to the
Dnieper River line.

They all complained that they had

too few men to hold the amount of territory assigned to
them against

the insurmountable odds which they faced.

Hitler insisted on holding the territory, especially
the bridgeheads for future attacks into the Soviet heartland.

The insistence on holding the bridgeheads tied

down the small amount of armor that von Manstein could
field against the Russians, and pinch off their armored
thrusts into the rear areas of Army Group South.

The
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German Army never launched a major attack against the
Russians after Kursk in 1943.

Hitler lived in a fantasy

world concerning future German attacks against the Russian Army.

His armies were in no condition to carry out

future attacks, but Hitler would not take the advice of
his generals, and try to hold on to the territory that
they had conquered, and negotiate for peace from a position of strength.
At many times during the year, von Manstein had proposed moving his army group to a shorter line in between
the Bug River and the Dnieper River, which would have allowed him to shorten his lines and allow his divisions to
defend the sectors assigned to them with more men.

Dur-

ing the time Army Group South occupied this line, German
engineers would construct a defensive line behind the Bug
River.

Von Manstein believed that his army group could

hold the Bug River line against almost any attack the
Russians could mount against it, if Hitler allowed the
construction of a fortified line.

He felt that if the

Germans could show the Russians the cost of attacking a
fortified river line, that the Russian generals would
force Stalin to make peace with the Germans, a peace
which would give up the land in Russia that the Germans
had taken, but guarantee them a secure frontier to their
east.
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Hitler refused to listen to the advice of his generals, and the Russians forced a crossing of the Dnieper
River.

They then consolidated their troops into a large

bridgehead the Germans could not eliminate. Even after
the break in the line, Hitler demanded that the Germans
hold on to the Dnieper River.

After further attacks, the

Russians forced the Germans off the Dnieper River at
every point but Cherkassy, and assaulted three of the
flanks of the troops which remained at Cherkassy.
After the Russians advanced from the river and pushed the Germans back in the northern section of Army Group
South's line, Hitler forced von Manstein to turn the city
of Kirovograd into a "fortress".

He refused to allow the

men trapped in the city to retreat, until they were surrounded.

Even after the hard lesson learned at

Kirovograd about forcing troops to hold on to territory
after the enemy had surrounded them, Hitler still demanded that his armies hold their positions at all costs.
Hitler forced the German troops in the Cherkassy Korsun
Pocket to hold on to the territory while the Russian
forces around them consolidated their positions.

His

decision to hold the pocket caused the disaster the
Germans faced at Cherkassy.

CHAPTER III
THE ENCIRCLEMENT
January 23-February ·3, 1944
Forming the Pocket
On January 23, 1944, strong Russian forces broke
through the German lines on the Dnieper River.

The Rus-

sian thrust hit the German lines just north of the projecting wing which the First Panzer Army held on the
Dnieper between the Seventh and Forty-Second Corps.

The

Russian motorized and armored divisions managed to drive
as far south as the Zvenigorodka area. 1
The Russians then attacked on the Eighth Army front,
at first launching only a reconnaissance in force.

The

attack came on a twelve mile front, which Eighth Army
held with no more than one man for every fifteen yards of
front.

After finding the weakness in the German lines,

the Russians launched deep probing attacks to ascertain
the German reserve situation in the rear areas.

When no

reserves were found in the immediate area, orders were
given for the Fourth Ukrainian Front to launch a massive
attack the next morning. 2
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The Fourth Guards Tank Army, and later, the Fifth
Guards Tank Army broke through the Eighth Army front and
drove westward to link up with the Russian fighting units
near Zvenigorodka. 3

Russian forces in the north under

General Vatutin and in the south under General Koniev
joined west of Cherkassy completing the encirclement of
the German forces there. 4

This action left the Russians

some eighty miles to the rear of the Germans encircled at
Cherkassy.

The Russian rear lay only fifteen miles west

of Korsun, giving the Russians a sixty-five mile corridor.5
The German Response
Hitler began looking seriously at the situation
around Cherkassy on the evening of January 23, 1944, just
after the Russian breakthroughs.

Colonel General Walter

Warlimont kept a diary of the meetings Hitler conducted
in his headquarters.

On that evening he recorded this

conversation:
Borgmann:
"There are 27 rifle divisions and
four armoured corps in the area. Here at
this point there are seventeen rifle divisions. Then northwest of Krivoirog there
are sixteen rifle divisions and one armoured
corps. At Kirovograd there are twenty-four
rifle divisions and five armoured corps."
Hitler:
too."
Borgmann:

"Is that here?

That comes into it

"In the area of the break-in here
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there are thirteen rifle divisions and one
armoured corps, at Cherkassy four rifle divisions, one armoured brigade.
In the area
of this break-in, forty two rifle divisions,
nine armoured corps, one cavalry corps in
the first wave and two armoured corps - in
there; three armoured corps not yet identified."
Hitler:
"How many identified armoured corps
has he in this area?"
Zietzler:
"He's got nine. The other may
possibly come along if they come up by rail." 6
The conversation goes on to cover the reserves the Germans could send into the area.
were at Korosten.

The nearest true reserves

The Germans employed the division

there to guard the railhead against partisan actions encouraged by the Russians.

This division consisted of

three experienced battalions and four battalions of new
recruits.

The nearest experienced reserve divisions not

actively engaged in some duty were in Poland.

Hitler al-

so discussed the possibility of bringing troops from as
far as France.

He also considered committing the Fourth

Mountain Division, employed at the time in the Alps battling partisans in Italy.

He considered the divisions

stationed in the west rested, and believed they could
help in the fighting. 7
Even at this point, Hitler had determined to hold on
to the bridgehead at Cherkassy.

He complained to his

headquarters staff that his generals were retreating
without reason, and causing hysteria among the troops.
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Hitler cited the retreat from Stalingrad, complaining
that the troops were out of control, and retreated much
farther then they should have.

Hitler called the retreat

from the Dnieper to their new line east of the Bug River
by Army Group South, idiotic. 8
Further Russian Advances
During the day on January 25, follow up Russian forces launched a large-scale attack against the Seventh
Corps.

The right flank division fell back toward the

southeast and south, and by the end of the day, the Russians held the roads leading to the flank and rear of the
Forty-Second Corps.

The Russians used these roads to

press forward via Medvin toward Boguslav and Ssteblev. 9
In order to protect their rear and flanks, the
Forty-Second Corps established a new rearward facing
front along the line of Boguslav-Ssteblev.

Colonel Gen-

eral Theobald Lieb, the commander of Forty-Second Corps,
believed that the Seventh Corps might still close the gap
that yawned between his corps and the Seventh.

But, this

hope proved fleeting as more Russian forces moved into
the area . 10
The Russians attacked the center and flanks of the
Eleventh Corps later in the day on January 25.

Following

repeated attacks, the Russians broke through the front of
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Eleventh Corps on the right flank and in the center.

In

order to prevent an encirclement of his corps, Colonel
General Stemmermann ordered his men to withdraw to the
west and northwest, toward the Forty-Second Corps. 11
On the night of January 27, the SS Panzer Division
Wiking received conformation that enemy units had occupied Schpola, in their rear areas.

General Gille im-

mediately sent out a reconnaissance in force, which confirmed the fears of the division:

enemy tank units

northwest of Schpola and near Zvenigorodka. 12
General Gille immediately ordered his communication
section to make contact with the rest of the elements of
his division.

More alarming news reached the divisional

headquarters when the communications section established
contact with the division's Replacement Training Battalion and Pioneer Combat School, located at Ssteblev.
Upon contacting the school, Gille learned that individual
enemy tank units were moving into Boguslav.

After this

report and the recon action, Gille determined that two
enemy tank forces were operating to his rear, and that
they had come from two different directions.

Gille de-

termined that the Russian forces were moving from north
to south, and vice versa.

Gille sent word to the High

Command and to the commander of First Panzer Army that
the Russians were attempting to encircle the German
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forces standing between Smela and Kanew.

Only later, did

the German High Command understand the magnitude of the
encirclement the Russians were attempting. 13
The Pocket at Olschana
Later, during the night, Gille received word that
the divisional supply services, located south of 01schana, had come under attack from enemy tanks.

The di-

visional supply services had formed a hedgehog defence
during the night, as had the combat school at Ssteblev.
Both areas had experienced fierce attacks by enemy tanks
and had been involved in heavy fighting throughout the
night.

The two groups merged early in the morning for-

ming Kampfgruppe Reder and having been reinforced by an
engineer battalion and the Narwa Battalion of the Estonian Brigade, held their ground defending Olschana. 14
Along with the small pocket of defenders at 01schana, the Russians created a large pocket of German
defenders anchored on the Dnieper River and extending
west past Korsun.

The pocket contained elements of the

First Panzer Army's Forty-Second Corps and elements of
the Eighth Army's Eleventh Corps.

Von Manstein desig-

nated the large encirclement the "Cherkassy Pocket'' after
the bridgehead the Germans held on the Dnieper River
there. 15

At this point, von Manstein assembled the forces
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of Forty-Second Corps and Eleventh Corps which managed to
avoid encirclement.

This group contained mostly the sup-

port and reserve elements of the two corps, but small
groups of infantry and other combat personnel managed to
outrun the Russian divisions trying to encircle them. 16
Inside the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket
At the time of the encirclement, Eleventh Corps consisted of three infantry divisions:
Seventy-Second and the 389th.

the Fifty-seventh,

None of these divisions

contained tanks, assault guns or adequate anti-tank
weapons.

Of these three divisions, only the seventy-

Second could carry on offensive operations.

The other

two divisions, with the exception of one regiment of the
Fifty-seventh Division, were unfit for offensive operations.

The artillery complement attached to the corps

comprised one assault gun brigade of two battalions
totaling six batteries and one battalion of light artillery.n
The Forty-Second Corps included:

Corps Detachment

B, the Eighty-Eighth Division and the Fifth SS Panzer
Division Wiking.

Von Manstein combined three infantry

divisions to form Corps Detachment B, under the command
of the commander of the 112th Infantry Division.

He de-

signated the new unit Corps Detachment Bin order to

36

cover the identity and weakness of the unit.

Von

Manstein had combined the remnants of the Saar-Palantine
112th Infantry Division, the Saxon 255th Infantry Division and the Silesian 332nd Infantry Division in order
to form the division sized unit.

Although the unit car-

ried a corps standard and contained three divisions, it
possessed the fighting strength of one infantry division,
containing three regiments with the normal complement of
artillery, a strong antitank battalion, but no tanks or
assault guns.

The Eighty-Eighth Division consisted of

two regiments totaling five battalions, but the artillery complement of the division had been badly mauled.

The Wiking Division was by far the strongest divi-

sion in the corps, and in the pocket as a whole, with two
armored infantry regiments, one tank regiment with a total of ninety tanks and the Belgian volunteer brigade
Wallonien, which contained about 1,000 men. 18
The pocket contained the remnants of many divisions
which had become attached to the two corps and others
which had just been caught in the wrong place at the
wrong time.

The Russians managed to trap part of the

Silesian 417th Grenadier Regiment, the Engineer Battalion
of the 168th Infantry Division as well as the 331st Bavarian Regiment of the 167th Infantry Division.

The poc-

ket also contained a battalion of the Silesian 213th Lo-
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cal Security Division and the Ski Battalion of the 323rd
Infantry Di vision. 19
On January 28, Lieb sent word to Eighth Army about
the situation within the pocket.

Lieb requested per-

mission to withdraw his forces from _ the Dnieper River.
Mission requires maintaining northeast front
against strong enemy pressure. Russian advance
against Ssteblew necessitates main effort on
southern sector. Request authority for immediate withdrawal of northern and eastern
fronts.
This will permit offensive action
toward southwest and prevent further encirclement and separation from XI Corps. 20
Lieb wanted to prevent a second encirclement from taking
place.

He wished to keep in contact with Stemmermann

hoping that as one unit, the two corps had a chance to
survive the encirclement and they would have a better
chance to break out together than separately. 21
At first the Russians believed that they had trapped
the entire Eighth Army and the army command element, a
total of ten and a half divisions containing 100,000 men,
within the pocket.

According to Colonel Kvach, the chief

of Koniev's command train, General Koniev, the Commander
of the Third Ukrainian Front, determined that the Cherkassy Pocket contained the entire German Eighth Army
under Colonel General Wohler.

Koniev correctly estimated

the strength of Eighth Army at nine armored divisions, an

ss panzer division, and an attached brigade.

Koniev had

wanted to destroy Eighth Army for a long time, the army
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had caused him trouble since he took command.

Eighth

Army contained nine of the best armored divisions the
Wehrmacht had to offer, and the destruction of the SS
formations would have only added to his victory.

There-

fore, the Russians decided to do everything in their power to destroy the Germans, because they greatly respected
the fighting capability of Eighth Army and the commander
of the army.

Only later did they realize the mistake

they had made.n
The First Rescue Attempt
Colonel General Hans Hube of the First Panzer Army
made the first attempt to free the men of the pocket.

He

sent a radio-telegram into the pocket, saying simply "I
am coming."

In two days, his units had reached a point

only nine kilometers from the pocket and in the process
destroyed 100 Russian tanks. 23

According to Lieutenant

Leon Degrelle of the Wallonien Brigade, this message
lifted the spirits of his men, they now believed that the
German High Command would not abandon them in the pocket
as the Belgians believed the German High Command had done
with the German troops at Stalingrad a year earlier.
Degrelle also greatly respected Hube as a leader and believed that he, if anybody, could carry off the attempt
to free them.~
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Hube's attack almost succeeded in freeing the Germans in the pocket.

Elements of the 108th Panzer Gren-

adier Regiment of the Fourteenth Panzer Division actually
broke into the pocket, on the second night of their attack.25

Unfortunately for the Germans within the pocket,

strong new Russian forces came up to attack Hube.

The

Russians attacked the Fourteenth Panzer with the Eleventh, Twelfth and Sixty-Third Cavalry Divisions.

The men

of the Fourteenth Panzer following up the 108th Panzer
Grenadier Regiment could not hold the breach in the Soviet lines open and had to fall back.

The rest of Hube's

men had to give up their positions only nine kilometers
from the pocket and withdraw.

With the new forces, the

Russians managed to set up a fifty mile wide security
zone around the pocket.

The Russian commanders also

brought several reserve formations with them to help
guarantee that they could hold the pocket against any
relief attempt the Germans might mount. 26
The Russians immediately began attacks to eliminate
the German forces within the pocket.

The Russians mount-

ed the heaviest attacks from the south and southeast.
These attacks pushed the surrounded Germans farther from
the lines of Army Group South and farther from a possible
relief effort.v
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Planning for a Second Relief Attempt
Von Manstein issued orders immediately to release
forces from his front in order to launch a relief effort
to save the men in the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket.

He would

not allow the men of his army group to face another disaster, such as the one faced at Stalingrad a year earlier.

He issued orders to release two panzer corps for

the relief attempt. 28
Von Manstein sent word to First Panzer Army to end
their defensive battle with the First Soviet Tank Army,
on their left wing, and release Third Panzer Corps with
utmost speed.

Third Panzer Corps would move to Cherkassy

with Sixteenth and Seventeenth Panzer Divisions, the
First ss Panzer Division Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler and
Heavy Panzer Regiment Baeke.

First Panzer Division would

follow the other three divisions as soon as the situation
permitted. 29
Eighth Army received instructions to release the
headquarters element of Forty-seventh Panzer Corps and
the Third Panzer Division from the army's front.

Von

Manstein sent orders to the commander of Sixth Army to
turn Twenty-Fourth Panzer Division over to Forty-Seventh
Panzer Corps for use in the relief operation.

Hitler

also gave von Manstein permission to use Eleventh Panzer
Division in the relief attempt if it arrived from the re-
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serve areas in time.

Hitler then delayed Eleventh Panzer

at the Bug River, hoping that it would not be needed and
that he could use it elsewhere.

Eleventh Panzer Division

joined the relief attempt only after the other divisions

°

had broken through the Russian lines. 3

Fourteenth Panzer

Division joined Forty-Seventh Panzer in the concentration
area coming out of the front lines of the army group.
Fourteenth Panzer had been in the front line trying to
contain the new Russian thrust which sought to keep
Eighth Army from freeing the men trapped in the pocket.
The division had already lost a full panzer grenadier
regiment, and none of the other units were at full
strength having just come out of the front lines after
months of continuous fighting. 31

Twenty-Fourth Panzer

arrived in the concentration area of Forty-seventh Panzer
Corps ready for combat, having come out of the reserve
area of the army group.

This division arrived in the

best shape to carry out the relief effort, all the other
divisions in the corps had not received rest, and two of
them came out of heavily contested battles.n
Two of the panzer divisions of Eighth Army designated for the relief effort were still in the midst of a
heavily contested battle in the area of Kapitanovka.

The

commander of Eighth Army decided to replace them with infantry divisions, but to do so, would stretch the fight-
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ing power of the infantry divisions to the utmost.

The

other two divisions were on the march toward the left
flank of Eighth Army.

Of the four divisions only one was

at full strength, after weeks of continuous fighting, the
other three divisions were in actuality only tank
supported combat teams.n
According to the diary of the Sixteenth Panzer Division, the division had endured continuous defensive
fighting for over four weeks.

After pulling out of the

line, the division moved south, and into the rear areas
of First Panzer Army.

They arrived in their concentra-

tion areas during the day on February 1.

Fortunately for

the men of the division, their concentration area lay in
a town.

The diary tells of the happiness the men felt

having a roof over their heads and a chance to shave and
get a hot meal after almost continuous fighting.

The

division received two days of rest before having to begin
the attack to reach Group Stemmermann.~
Lieutenant Colonel Doctor Franz Baeke led his heavy
panzer regiment into the concentration area of Third Panzer Corps.

His group came directly out of the front

lines and received no rest before going back into battle
in order to relieve Group Stemmerrnann.

Baeke commanded a

group of thirty-eight Tiger tanks and Forty-seven Panther
tanks."
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Hitler Meddles in the Relief Effort
Von Manstein had ordered Sixth Army to release
Twenty-Fourth Panzer Division in order to help Eighth
Army's Forty-seventh Panzer Corps with the relief effort.
After traveling almost 200 miles to ·take part in the attack, Hitler changed the orders of the panzer division.
Hitler ordered Twenty-Fourth Panzer to turn around and
repeat the grueling 200 mile trek it had just undertaken
to take part in the relief effort.M
Hitler ordered von Manstein to turn Sixth Army over
to Army Group A, under the command of Field Marshall
Ewald von Kleist.

He made von Manstein give Twenty-

Fourth Panzer back to Sixth Army in order to keep the
fighting ability of this unit intact.

Hitler then or-

dered Sixth Army into the Nikopol Bridgehead in order to
hold it open for an offensive into the Caucasus.

Hitler

also needed the Nikopol, because it protected Army Group
A.

The loss of the Nikopol Bridgehead would force Army

Group A to evacuate the Crimean Peninsula.~
Von Manstein contacted Field Marshall von Kleist and
expressed his interest in trading an infantry division
for Twenty-Fourth Panzer.

Von Kleist agreed to accept

the trade, because he needed a division to hold ground
and he knew that an infantry division could do the job as
well as a panzer division.

Hitler's generals argued with
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him continuously that a panzer division needed mobility
and that the infantry should hold ground.

The arguments

always fell on deaf ears and Hitler ordered von Manstein
to turn Twenty-Fourth Panzer Division over to Army Group
A as planned. 38
Twenty-Fourth Panzer fought it's way through the mud
and arrived at the Nikopol Bridgehead.

After travelling

over 400 miles round trip, the division needed time in
the reserve areas to refit.

Almost every single tank

broke down on the way to the Nikopol and because of the
mud, the troops ended up pushing the trucks and untracked self propelled guns.

The troops arrived in the

bridgehead in as poor condition as the equipment of the
division.

By the time the Twenty-Fourth became battle-

worthy again, Army Group A had pulled out of the Nikopol
Bridgehead.

Twenty-Fourth Panzer traveled to Nikopol for

nothing, but the Germans could have made good use of the
fire power of the division during the Cherkassy relief
attempt. 39
Support for the Relief Attempt
In order to support the relief attacks, von Manstein
assembled his ground attack squadrons.

Hans Rudel led

his Immelmann Squadron of Junker-87 dive bombers to sup-

port the Eleventh and Thirteenth Panzer Divisions of the
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Third Panzer Corps. 40

Rudel attacked not only the tanks

barring the way, but also the slower Russian dive bombers
attacking the divisions he supported.
Here there are plenty of good targets for us;
air activity on both sides is intense, the Iron
Gustavs in particular trying to emulate us by
attacking our tank divisions and their supply
units. With our slow Ju. 87s we always do our
best to break up and chase away these IL II
formations, but they are a little bit faster
than we are because, unlike ourselves they have
a retractable undercarriage. 41
Rudel mainly went after the tanks, the sheer number of
tanks involved made them much more inviting targets, and
the tanks were his assigned mission.G
During the Cherkassy operation, Rudel flew the only
cannon carrying Stuka available to his squadron.

Early

in the operation Rudel found himself with no tanks to attack, but spotted a squadron of IL 2's in formation with
P-39 Aircobras and other Russian fighters.

Rudel

contacted his wingman, at that time who was circling with
him looking for targets, and ordered him to support his
attack on the IL 2's.

He dove on the squadron and ac-

tually managed to gain on the planes during his dive.

He

downed one IL-2 with his cannon before the Russian fighters came after him forcing him to return to Uman. 43
Von Manstein transferred his headquarters train to
Uman, so that he could better oversee the progress of the
two corps involved in the relief attempt.

Colonel Gen-
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eral Hube of First Panzer Army had his headquarters at
Uman, von Manstein made use of some of Hube's staff to
help him oversee the relief attempt.

Colonel General

Wohler of Eighth Army had his headquarters near Uman and
was easily accessible from there.~
Von Manstein tried twice to travel to the fronts of
each of the two panzer corps of the relief effort, each
time in vain.

His vehicles bogged down in the mud and he

had to turn around.

Since he could not travel by ground,

he decided to use the air arm attached to his assault
groups to obtain the information he needed in order to
better command the troops under his command.

He utilized

the airport at Uman not only to supply the pocket and to
receive the wounded, but to command his assault groups,
as well as to recon the area in front of his attack
groups.~
Matters Within the Pocket
Colonel General Lieb received orders from von
Manstein to consolidate his forces on the morning of
January 29.
Prepare withdrawal in direction Rossava up to
Mironovka-Boguslav. Be ready to move by 1200
on 29 January upon prearranged signal. Authority for further withdrawal likely within
twenty-four hours. Report new situation. 46
This withdrawal moved Forty-Second corps closer to
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Eleventh Corps.

Von Manstein, without Hitler's per-

mission, also granted Lieb permission to withdraw his
corps from the Dnieper river.

During the communication,

Lieb reported his need for additional ammunition and advised his superiors that the evacuation of the wounded
from Korsun airport progressed too slowly.

He reported

2,000 casualties so far within the pocket. 47
Lieb recorded the situation facing Eleventh Corps in
his diary on the 29th of January.

He reported that Stem-

mermann's men faced strong Russian tank forces to the
front of his corps.

According to Lieb's diary, several

of the regiments of Eleventh Corps were reduced to only
100 men.

Lieb also recorded that his units were now re-

ceiving supplies, but that even at this time he foresaw
shortages.u
On January 31, Hitler ordered von Manstein to consolidate the chain of command within the pocket.

Von

Manstein gave control of all the men within the pocket to
Colonel General Stemmermann, the commander of Eleventh
·corps.

His new command, renamed Group Stemmermann, con-

tained all the units within the pocket.
had neither a staff or a signal corps.

His new command
He received no

help from outside the pocket, but received the disturbing
order to hold his old positions on the Dnieper river.
Stemmermann now had to hold the original sixty mile front
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his two corps had held before the encirclement, along
with a new two-hundred mile front the Russians created on
his flanks and in his rear.

His groups had barely held

the sixty mile front originally assigned to them, and the
outlook for holding an extra front over three times the
length of the old front seemed dismal. 0
Beginning the Airlift
During their encirclement of the Cherkassy-Korsun
Pocket, the Russians cut the supply roads leading to the
Forty-seventh and Eleventh Corps.

The only roads avail-

able to carry supply traffic led through Schpola and
Zvenigorodka.

Colonel General Stemmermann requested sup-

ply by air, and the Luftwaffe rose to the challenge. 50
Group Stemmermann needed supply right away, most of
their supply depots had fallen into Russian hands before
the Russians completed their encirclement.

According to

Degrelle, large stores of gasoline and munitions fell into Russian hands on January 28, as the two encircling armies came together in the rear of Group Stemmermann. 51
In order to supply group Stemmermann fully by air,
the Luftwaffe established a goal of delivering seventy
tons of ammunition, gasoline, tank parts, weapons, food
and other supplies per day.

The Luftwaffe also delivered

specialized medical personnel to help care for the wound-
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ed within the pocket.

In order to protect the transport

flights, the Germans flew light anti-aircraft batteries
to the airport at Korsun during the first few days of the
airlift operation.

The planes also flew experienced

ground personnel into the pocket to help lessen the turn
around times of the planes and possibly repair some of
the lightly damaged planes upon landing. 52
The planes began landing in the pocket on January
31, 1944.

The Eighth Air Corps of the Fourth Air Fleet

flew from Uman in order to supply the surrounded men.
Three air transport wings took part in the supply effort.
They flew from three different air fields:
Proskurov and Uman.

Golta,

The only supply depot available to

the Germans in the area lay near the airfield at Uman.
Planes taking off from the other two airfields flew to
Uman first to pick up the necessary supplies before going
to the airfield at Korsun, within the pocket. 53
The planes flew the first few missions in close
formation at hedgehopping altitude.

Unfortunately for

the pilots, the Russians had set up their anti-aircraft
defenses almost immediately after their armored formations had completed the encirclement.

Some German planes

were shot down and others were heavily damaged early on
in the supply operations.

In order to cut their losses,

the Germans varied their supply and return routes from
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the pocket.~
On one occasion the commander of the third group of
the Third Transport Wing decided to lead his group back
to Uman at a higher altitude.

He wished to avoid the

heaviest of the anti-aircraft fire, but led his group
into a different kind of trouble.

Russian fighters jump-

ed his group and managed to down twelve Junker 52 transport planes."
Russian Air Support
The Russians had assigned the Second and Fifth Air
Armies to destroy the encircled men of Group Stemmermann.
These two air armies were attached to the First and Second Ukrainian Fronts, respectively. 56

The two air ar-

mies contained a combined strength of 997 aircraft (772
were operational) when the operations against the encircled forces began.fl
Two more air armies were assigned to attack the
German air fields at Uman and to attack any relief efforts the Germans mounted to rescue the men in the pocket.

The Seventeenth and Eighth Air Armies, attached re-

spectively to the Third and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts were
assigned these two tasks.

These two air armies contained

a strength of 1,363 aircraft.~
Russian fighter coverage was especially heavy over

51

the airfield at Korsun.

The Russian fighters came only

when the German transports lacked fighter coverage.

Even

when the transports did have fighter coverage, it was inadequate for normal operations.

But, even the light

fighter coverage the German transports did have, managed
to scare most of the Russian fighter pilots away. 59
New Problems Within the Pocket
On February 1, Lieb recorded the following entry in
his diary:

"Fighter protection inadequate.

and fuel running low."

Ammunition

He made his concerns known to his

immediate commander, and hoped the situation would improve.w
On the night of February 1-2, fifty Russians who
manned the heavy mortars of the Wallonien Brigade began
to move towards the Russian lines around Olshanka.

Only

one Belgian sentry from the Wallonien Brigade stood in
the way of the Russians and they killed him during their
escape.

The desertion not only meant the loss of an ar-

tillery battery, but the Russians gained men with knowledge of the Belgian defenses within the pocket. 61
The next day, February 2, the Russians launched an
attack in the Wallonien sector.

The Russians utilized

the information they gained from their fellow Russians
who had defected from the Belgians the night before.

The
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Russians attacked between Losovok and the Dnieper River
at the very extremity of the Wallonien lines.

Only a few

dozen Belgians defended the front at this point in the
line.

The Russians managed to take Losovok during the

day on the second, forcing the Wallonien Brigade to request permission to withdraw the Second Company which had
held the line from Losovok to Moshny.

The Belgians re-

ceived orders denying the request to withdraw, and ordering them to retake the town. 62
Lieutenant Degrelle led the counterattack against
the Russians at Losovok and received two panzers to help
him with the endeavor.

The tanks managed to help the

Belgians, but ran into problems of their own:
Through great rivers of mud, along routes
flooded with water spreading to a breadth of a
hundred meters, we pushed eastward. Overturned
automobiles and the hooves of dead horses were
everywhere, half sunk in the slime near the
trails.m
The mud, as well as the obstacles in the road, hindered
the movement of the tanks.M
The Germans fired eighteen artillery shells to support the Belgian attack.

The Belgians did manage to take

most of the town, but just as success seemed in their
grasp, General Gille gave them orders to evacuate the entire sector.

Degrelle had to move his men fast because

the infantry on his flanks had completed their withdrawal
and he was still on the river, surrounded on three sides.
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The Belgians were also running frightfully low on ammunition and other supplies.

Most disturbing to Degrelle

was the fact that he found the rest of the pocket too,
had become low on ammunition and supplies. 65
During their withdrawal from Losovok, the Belgians
faced many problems.

the Germans had withdrawn the rest

of their troops from the Dnieper River line and the Russians had infiltrated men into the section of Losovok
still held by the Belgians.

The Belgians not only faced

the Russians directly to their front, but the enemy also
had men on their flanks and in the town to their rear.
The Belgians only vehicle, an old volkswagen, kept stalling and getting stuck, due to the mud and terrible weather conditions.

The Belgians managed to evacuate the town

and continued their retreat along with the rest of the
Germans who had held the Dnieper.M
After the third day of the airlift operations both
the approach and return flights were made at higher altitudes.

The groups flew between 7,640 and 9,550 feet

with an escort of three Messershmitt Me-109 fighters per
group.

At some times, no fighters were available for the

return flight.

At these times, the transport planes de-

layed their departure until after dark, hoping to avoid
most of the Russian fighters. 67
The Russians also attacked the airfield at Korsun in
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order to hinder the German supply efforts.

The Russians

used their IL-2 low level bomber to attack the field.

On

February 3, the Russians launched fourteen low level attacks against the field at Korsun.~
All of the diary entries Lieb made for the first few
days of the pocket express concern at the progress of the
airlift.

Since his entry on February 1, he noticed a

gradual improvement in the amount of supplies delivered
by the airlift.

The heavy Russian attacks on the pocket

put a strain on the ammunition supply within the pocket.
On February 4, Lieb recorded a daily expenditure of over
200 tons of ammunition per day for his corps alone.

He

requested the airlift of 2,000 men to replace his casualties, which he reported at 300 per day.

Lieb also

requested the delivery of an extra 120 tons of ammunition
per day.~
By February 3, 1944, the Germans had been pushed off
the Dnieper River and forced to retreat toward the west.
At the same time, the Russians continued their attacks
from south and southwest of the pocket.

The Russians

widened their corridor from around fifty miles when the
pocket closed, to an average distance of eighty miles. 70
Stemmermann gave orders on February 3, to prepare
the equipment of the pocket for the expected withdrawal.
stemmermann decided that as soon as Hitler issued the or-
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der to evacuate the pocket, that his men could begin the
evacuation, instead of having to collect their equipment.
Stemmermann detailed over two-thirds of the men in the
pocket to begin preparing the heavy equipment and vehicles for the breakout.

Unfortunately for the Germans,

the columns of stalled trucks were very inviting targets
for the Russian fighters circling overhead.
Already the road from Gorodishche to Korsun,
our last chance to breakout, was jammed by an
incredible column. Thousands of trucks, spread
over twenty kilometers, followed three front
vehicles and skated in the black frogholes of
the road, which had become a prodigious cloaca.
The most powerful artillery tractors struggled
painfully to open a passage. This enormous
mass of vehicles was an incomparable target for
planes. The Soviet machines, like strident
swarms of wasps, would circle over the Kessel
and dive down in squadrons every ten minutes
onto the bogged-down column.
Everywhere trucks
were burning. 71
The Germans faced the elements and the Russians in trying
to consolidate their vehicles for the breakout.

Many of

the vehicles had to be abandoned later, because they
could not move through the mud.

The Germans destroyed

the abandoned vehicles so they would not fall into the
hands of the Russians. 72
Later, the road became totally unusable due to the
one thousand vehicles that could no longer move.

At

first, the Germans tried using the fields, but within
one-hundred meters of the road, the trucks bogged down in
the endless mire.

The Germans then made use of their
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last hope for moving the vehicles, the railroad line between Gorodishche and Korsun.

The Russians continued

their attacks against the German vehicles on the railroad
line.

In order to continue using the railroad, the Ger-

mans had to continuously push the burning and wrecked vehicles from the rail-line.TI
On February 3, Lieb reported to Eighth Army the
continual improvement of the air supply effort.

He also

reported that several of the transport planes making
their return trip from the pocket, carrying wounded, were
shot down by Russian fighters.

Lieb requested that ei-

ther the transports receive adequate fighter coverage for
their return trip or take wounded out of the pocket only
at night.~
Lieb and Stemmermann both agreed that the main focus
of their defense should face south.

They needed to hold

as much territory in this direction, because the relief
forces were approaching the pocket from the south and
southwest.

Korsun, the assembly area of the pocket, lay

al-most in artillery range of the Russian artillery batteries south of the pocket.

If the Russians managed to

push the Germans any farther north, they could shell the
airfield at Korsun, hindering the effort to supply the
pocket, and endangering the wounded at the hospitals
there.

For these two reasons, Stemmermann issued orders
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to weaken his northern and eastern flanks in order to
strengthen his defenses facing south.TI
Hitler Meddles Again
Von Manstein had hoped that the two corps he
assembled to relieve the pocket could launch their attacks on the night of February 2-3 and no later than the
night of February 3-4.

But, Hitler meddled in the af-

fairs at the front once again.

He ordered that neither

of the two armies releasing units for the relief attempt
could give up any territory.

This order forced the army

commanders to postpone the attacks of the relief columns
from the night of the 2-3 to the day of February 3, in
order to reshuffle their troops, so as not to give any
ground.

Unfortunately, a warming trend began on February

3, causing a heavy fog which delayed the attacks of both
corps until late in the morning.n

Chapter IV
MOUNTING THE RELIEF EFFORT
February 3-15, 1~44
The German Breakthroughs
Third Panzer Corps launched an attack from a point
west of the pocket, taking the Russian forces surrounding
the pocket in the rear.

Forty-seventh Panzer Corps at-

tacked the Russian flank, attacking from a point southwest of the pocket.

Von Manstein hoped that the attacks

of the two panzer corps would meet with success.

He be-

lieved that the disparity in the number of units utilized
in the attack would be partially offset, because the Russian forces that faced his units had been in the lines
for a long period of time and were well below their normal strength, as were the units he was using in the relief corps. 1
Von Vormann launched attacks with his Forty-Seventh
Panzer Corps with Third and Fourteenth Panzer Divisions.
At the time of the attack, both panzer divisions still
had units heavily embroiled in battle, so von Vormann
could only use a portion of his two division strength at
58
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the beginning of his attack.

Neither of the two divi-

sions had received any rest before starting their attacks.2
The relief effort met problems from the start.
First snow and then mud delayed the _assembly of the two
panzer corps.

Fog delayed the attack and Hitler had just

stripped it of one of it's finest divisions and delayed a
second division until long after the relief attacks started.

But, the relief forces did the best they could con-

sidering the weather and the assets available to them.
The two corps launched attacks first to cut the communication network of the enemy and then to surround them as
well.

He hoped to destroy the forces surrounding the

Forty-Second and Eleventh Corps with concentric attacks. 3
Hitler ordered the two attacks so that he could create a
pocket of his own and destroy the whole of the Russian
forces involved in the two breakthroughs.

Hitler also

hoped that the two corps could reinforce the troops in
the pocket and regain a favorable jump-off base for his
projected counteroffensive to retake Kiev. 4
Objections to the Conduct of the Relief Attempts
During a conference General Wohler, the commander of
Eighth Army, expressed his doubts about the success of
two relief attempts.

He cited the problems with the mud
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and the limited forces which von Manstein could employ to
launch his attack.

He recommended that instead of having

Third panzer Corps attack due north, that they turn east
as soon as possible to join forces with the advance elements of Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps. 5
Colonel General Wohler then went to von Manstein to
request that he change the direction of attack of the
Third Panzer Corps.

Wohler felt that the men in the

pocket could not hold out long enough for a plan of the
magnitude Hitler wished to execute to work.

Wohler

wished to combine the two relief attempts and attack
along the shortest route to the pocket in order to
guarantee the survival of Group Stemmermann. 6
Problems for Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps
New Russian attacks further hindered the relief
effort by Forty-seventh Panzer Corps from south of the
pocket.

The Russians committed strong new infantry and

armored forces in an attack toward Novomirgorod.

Von

Vormann shifted elements of two of his divisions from the
relief attempt to defend the town against the Russians. 7
In the evening on February 3, General von Vormann
reported that his Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps
longer carry out offensive operations.

could no

His already weak-

ened divisions had gained a bridgehead at Izhrennoye, but
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Russians attacks continually whittled down his combat effective strength.

After the days offensive, von Vormann

reported his corps contained only twenty-seven tanks and
thirty-four assault guns still operational.

Von Vormann

believed that he could still hold his ground and that his
divisions were tying down considerable Russian forces. 8
Third Panzer Pushes On
Third Panzer Corps attacked toward the north in
order to take advantage of favorable tank terrain.

The

pocket also lay due north of Third Panzer Corps, an attack in this direction meant that Third Panzer Corps lost
no time in advancing in other directions. 9

Third Panzer

Corps launched their attack on February 3, with only the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Panzer Divisions and Heavy Panzer Regiment Baeke.

Advanced elements of the Leibstan-

darte joined the attack on February 4, while the rest of
the division, as well as the First Panzer Division could
not join the attack until much later. 10
Weather Problems
The weather hindered the Russian efforts to destroy
the German pocket as well.
operational after the thaw.

Only three airfields remained
The Russians had only sta-

tioned between 50 and 100 aircraft at each airstrip.
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That meant that only around 150 to 300 aircraft were
available to the Russians during the beginning of the
thaw, but later the Russians managed to transport most of
the strength of the two air armies to the three serviceable fields.

Even with the reduced air power due to the

loss of use of the other air fields in the area, the
Russians managed to fly 3,800 sorties against the Germans
within the pocket between January 29 and February 3. 11

In

order that all forms of aircraft keep flying, the Russians concentrated several air regiments at each open
field.

The regiments each contained a different type of

plane, each airfield had a fighter, ground attack, transport, dive bomber and heavy bomber regiment. 12
According to Soviet sources, Russian planes launched
an attack against the German supply wing based in the
Vinnitsa region.

The Soviets claim eighty transport air-

craft destroyed on the ground.

They claim that the de-

struction of these transports seriously hindered the German effort to supply their troops within the pocket. 13
Resistance Toughens
During the day on February 4, the men of the Leibstandarte Panzer Division managed to take a key position
known to the Germans as Height 246.3, some two miles
north of Tinowka.

The Russians assaulted the German po-
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sitions on the height and managed to wipe out most of the
sixth Company which held the left flank.

Four survivors

held the flank against thirty-four Russians and three T34 tanks.

Two of their number were killed and the other

two, reduced to using their service pistols held the
flank until a battalion counterattack drove off the
Russians. 14
Von Manstein ordered Third Panzer Corps to change
the direction of their attack due east.

The attack would

advance via Lissyanka moving toward Morentsy.

Von Man-

stein ordered that the Third Panzer Corps launch their
final attack to relieve the pocket as soon as the advanced element of the group reached Lissyanka. 15
After the first day of the relief attack, the Third
Panzer Corps had moved several miles towards the pocket.
The fog set in during the night and movement the next day
became near impossible for either side.

Because of the

difficulties associated with moving through the mud, the
tanks had burned up a considerable amount of gasoline.
They not only burned extra fuel due to having to pull
themselves out of the mud, but burned fuel trying to find
ground suitable to even move across.

Since trucks were

unable to move through the mud, Third Panzer Corps received orders to mobilize civilian help to carry gasoline
to the front.

Brieth issued orders to requisition all
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horses, carts and sleds in the area to aid them in moving
supplies. 16
Defending the Pocket
At dawn on February 5, the Wallonien Brigade received orders to occupy the trench line between Staroselye to
Derenkovez.

This line, dug by Ukrainian volunteers in

early January, extended southeast to northwest along high
crests which overlooked valleys and bogs.

The trench

line had firing emplacements, but had been dug too deep
and lacked fascines.

The Belgians defended the trench

with an average of ten men for each kilometer of front.
In order to preserve their fighting strength at key
points, Degrelle placed his men in groups and posted them
along the line. 17
During the day on February 5, Lieutenant Heder
decided that his Kampfgruppe could no longer hold 01schana against the superior forces of the Russians that
had assailed them since January 28.

On the night of Feb-

ruary 5-6, Reder ordered his men to abandon their positions, and withdraw to the line of the Wiking Division.
At 02.30 hours, the men of the kampfgruppe broke through
the Russian lines and rejoined their division in the
Cherkassy Korsun Pocket. 18
Hitler decided on February 5, that the two corps
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trapped in the pocket might have to breakout of the pocket and come part way to meet the relief columns.

On the

same day the O.K.W. decided to award both of the commanding generals within the pocket the Knight's Cross of the
Iron Cross "to boost morale".

Von Manstein thought that

the commanders should receive the award after an actual
order for the breakout came, in order to avoid comparisons with January 1943."
During the morning on February 6, the Russians began
attacks against the Belgian trenchline near Staroselye.
According to Degrelle, the Russians managed to scale the
counterscarp during the night, crossing the Belgian
trench line at a point directly between two posts.

The

Russians surprised and then strangled the men in these
posts and moved to a windmill which dominated the high
ground at this point in the trench line.

The Russians

managed to take the entire trench line after some hours
of fighting and moved into Staroselye.

The artillery of

the division became useless, because of the sheer number
of troops crossing the front of their lines. 20
The Belgians regrouped outside the town and attacked
the Russians in Staroselye and also in the trenchline.
They reentered the trenchline below the town and followed it uphill towards the Russians.

Two German tanks

arrived later to lead the rest of the Belgians directly
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up the hill.

Many of the Russians took to their heels as

soon as the noise of the German tanks became audible.

By

16.00, the Belgians managed to retake the hill and the
rest of the trench line. 21
On February 6, 1944, von Manstein decided that the
two panzer corps could not reach the pocket under their
own power and that the men in the pocket would have to
move to meet their rescuers.

The reports he received

from the two commanders were still optimistic, but he had
to accept the truth that the mud and Russians might prove
too much for his six divisions to overcome (Eleventh
Panzer Division was still in route to the front lines
from the Bug River).

The after action reports he

received from the commanders of the two panzer corps
showed the abundance of equipment the Russians now had in
their army stores.
Between the two corps, they reported the capture of more than 700 tanks, over 600 anti-tank
guns and about 150 field pieces, but only just
over 2,000 soldiers. This indicated that the
enemy forces had been largely made up of motorized formations. 22
This indicates that the Russians had no shortage of equipment they could employ in their divisions.
Even though the Russians suffered terrible losses,
they still managed to keep the men of the relief forces
from being successful in their attempt to free the forces
of Group Stemmermann.

On February 6, the day von Man-
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stein ordered Stemmermann to concentrate his forces, the
pocket measured thirty miles from north to south and
twelve miles from east to west . . Von Manstein took his
own initiative and ordered Group Stemmermann to make a
breakout towards the southwest.

Von Manstein set a date

for the breakout at this point, but due to the problems
the relief forces met, he kept having to move the date
back.n
The Relief Continues
February 6, saw the troops of Third Panzer Corps
still making some painfully slow progress towards the
pocket.

Tank crewmen carried buckets of fuel back and

forth to their tanks in order to insure that they could
continue operations.

Infantrymen walked barefoot, with

their boots in their packs.

They found that their boots

hindered movement, while wearing boots, they had to stop
every few times they lifted their foot to retrieve their
boot, which stuck fast in the mud.M
To Keep the Airlift Alive
Lieutenant Leon Degrelle recorded that around seventy Junkers 52 transport planes landed within the pocket per day.

In the seven days that the planes were able

to land in the pocket, they managed to empty the hospi-
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tals of wounded men. 25

In all, the planes took 2,825

wounded men out of the pocket.
the pocket lay at Uman.

The closest hospital to

Along with stopping at Uman for

supplies, all the planes leaving the pocket stopped at
Uman to unload the wounded they brought with them out of
the pocket.

Unfortunately for the Germans a thaw set in,

making landings at first difficult, and later impossible.u
During the first few days of the thaw, German engineers were able to drain the field so that the planes
could land.

Later, the Germans used earth moving equip-

ment to raise a landing strip out of the water on the
field.

But, the mud and rain became too much for them

and they could no longer clear the landing strip to insure a safe landing.

According to Degrelle's memoirs,

the last plane to attempt to land in the pocket flipped
over, after burying a wing in the mud.

The plane lay on

the raised air strip in mud a meter deep.v
The rapidly changing weather conditions, frost at
night, followed by a thaw during the day, made landing at
the Korsun airport very difficult, if not impossible.
The Luftwaffe chose to temporarily suspend landing operations until the weather improved for landing and the
ground stayed frozen all the time.

The Germans made the

necessary preparations for the procurement of parachute
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canisters for supplying the troops of Group Stenunermann. 28
The Russians Step Up the Pressure
During the morning on February 7, the Russians
assaulted the Belgian trench line near Staroselye once
again.

The German tanks which had supported the Belgians

in retaking the trenchline had already been recalled and
the 250 some survivors of the first battle of the trenches stood no chance against the attacking Russians.

The

Russians, after taking Staroselye, now had a clear path
into the flank of the columns of Germans retreating
towards Korsun.~
The Belgians spent the rest of the day trying to
reestablish a cohesive line on the flank of Group Stemmermann.

The Belgians sent patrols into the forests in

the area, hoping to discourage the Russians from attacking through the German lines there.

Skirmishes broke out

throughout the forest between the Belgian patrols and the
Russians in the forest.

The Belgian artillery now had to

fire without rest to try to guarantee that the Russians
would not break through the Belgian lines which had been
hastily established between Staroselye and the flank of
the German column heading towards Korsun. 30
Because of the proximity of the Russian advance
units to the German columns, many of the Germans lost
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hope of retrieving their heavy equipment from the pocket.
The most powerf~l of the German artillery tractors spent
an entire day and night moving just over thirty kilometers along the rail line.

Wrecked automobiles and

trucks littered the railway line to Korsun.

The Bel-

gians, the rearguard of Group Stemmermann, fired all the
trucks that could no longer move through the mud. 31
Appraising the Pocket of the Chances for Success
On February 7, Group Stemmermann received news that
had mixed blessings for them.

the O.K.H. sent

Stemmermann the following message:
Relief advance by III. Panzer Korps toward
Morentzy. Gruppe Stemmermann will shorten the
front lines and move with the pocket in the
direction of Schanderowka in order to be able
to break out toward the relieving forces at the
proper time. 32
Stemmermann felt relief that he could withdraw his lines,
but hoped that the relief attempts still would succeed,
for he had mixed feelings about the success of a breakout
attempt. 33
The Sixteenth Panzer, following directly behind
Heavy Panzer Regiment Baeke, reported that they made only
twenty kilometers per day progress towards the pocket.
After only a few days of fighting through the mud, the
artillery complement of the division reported only two
functioning artillery tractors.

Therefore, the division
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decided to leave their artillery behind, instead of having to destroy the guns when the engines on the last of
their artillery tractors burnt out.~
Two Separate German Airlifts
February 7, stretched the German air lift effort,
because two separate groups desperately needed supply on
that day.

During his assault on the Gniloy Tikich,

Brieth informed the headquarters of Eight Army of his
acute shortage of supplies.

The mud had stopped all of

his wheeled supply vehicles and the amount of supplies
his troops could carry to the front could not meet the
demands of his units."
Brieth was told to expect an air drop late in the
afternoon.

Low clouds and heavy rain dominated the bat-

tle field, and Brieth doubted the ability of the German
airmen to deliver supplies in foul weather.

Some German

aircraft, however, managed to reach Brieth's group, and
delivered enough supplies to keep his men fighting until
troops could cut the bogged down trucks out of the mud.
Adequate supplies reached Brieth during the night of the
seventh.

The small airlift to Third Panzer Corps met the

needs of the German troops, and kept the relief effort
going one more day.M
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Stemmermann Must Break Out
On February 8, Colonel General Brieth informed von
Manstein that he must delay the attack he planned to
reach the Gniloy Tikich Stream today because of the mud.
At this point, von Manstein informed Hitler that the
planned reinforcement of the pocket was no longer possible and that the forces within the pocket would have to
drive further than originally planned to meet their rescuers.n
Stemmermann in Jeopardy
The Wallonien Brigade faced a serious threat to its
flanks on February 8.

Russian forces had breached the

German line on the right flank of the Wallonien and
caused their headlong retreat.

The Russians had also

smashed the line that elements of the Wiking Division
held on the left flank of the Wallonien Brigade. 38
The Russian spearheads, on both sides of the Wallonien Brigade managed to take the little village of
Skiti, in the rear area of the brigade.

The brigade com-

mand post now stood as the only area between the two Russian spearheads held by friendly troops.

The men of the

Wallonien Brigade managed to recapture Skiti later and
managed to force an escape route through the Russian
lines.

The brigade received orders to abandon the vil-
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lage of Skiti the next morning, February 9, and received
orders to move off towards Derenkovez and set up a new
defensive line on the flank of Group Stemmermann there. 39
February 9, saw the Wiking Division facing dire
straits in their attempt to hold the front assigned to
them.

General Gille issued orders to form an infantry

company out of elements of the Wiking Division not involved in combat.

Four officers and two-hundred-twenty

men formed the company.

Armaments for the company con-

sisted of twelve machine guns (the rest of the men carried submachine guns, rifles, side-arms and grenades).
Gille deployed this unit to contain the enemy bridgehead
at Ambrusino.

This unit saw action between February 11-

17, suffering two dead, seventeen wounded and thirty-five
missing.~
The Russians began attacking the Belgian positions
around Derenkovez on February 9.

The Belgians had set up

a defensive horseshoe facing north, northeast and east.
This horseshoe protected the road from Korsun, which
started off to the south in the Belgian rear.

The SS

Nordland Regiment of the Wiking Division took positions
to the east and southeast of the Wallonien Brigade in
order to help them protect the convoys leaving from Derenkovez and moving to the collection point at Korsun. 41
The Russians attacked the lines of the Nordland Reg-
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irnent

and drove it into headlong flight.

General Gille

of the Wiking Division immediately ordered the regiment
to retake their old lines, because the Russian thrust
threatened the Belgian rear areas.

The Germans began

using the men from the retreating column, who no longer
had their trucks, or equipment, as infantry. 42
Men of the Wallonien Brigade, reinforced by the newly created infantry, began attacks to reestablish the
line the Nordland Regiment held.

The Belgians forced the

Russians to retreat two kilometers, and even took "numerous" prisoners.

Later in the day, men from the Nord-

land Regiment, corning from the opposite direction, managed to force the rest of the Russians in the area to retreat, and reestablished the protecting ring around the
road to Korsun.

According to Degrelle, by the time the

men of the Nordland Regiment arrived in the town, the
Belgians were already sitting around drinking coffee and
warming themselves by their fires. 43
The Russians reported the fall of Gorodische inside
the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket on February 9.

On February

14, Korsun fell to the Russians, according to their
sources, and on February 15, the Russians reported that
they had destroyed the last of the relief forces.~
Von Manstein received disturbing news from Colonel
General Sternrnermann on February 11.

This message stated
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that his Eleventh Corps was now on the verge of totally
collapsing under continuing Russian pressure.

His two

weak, and one average strength divisions had been in the
German front lines since September and were now on their
last legs.

Stemmermann stated that his troops needed the

relief efforts to reach them fast, or there would be
nothing left of his group to relieve.~
Stepping Up the Relief Effort
In desperation, von Manstein ordered that Third
Panzer Corps launch their final drive for the pocket on
February 11.

The advanced elements, Heavy Panzer Reg-

iment Baeke and Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, fought their
way into the southern quarter of Lissyanka.

Hindered

more by mud than by the Russians, they managed to force
their way to the banks of the Gniloy Tikich Stream.
O.K.W. ordered that they ford the stream immediately
while they still had momentum.

Colonel General Brieth

reported back that his units could not possibly cross the
stream today, that they were so short of supplies that
they would have to stop until more gasoline and ammunition could reach them.

Brieth reported that the mud

made movement next to impossible and that his tanks were
burning fuel at three times the normal rate.

His units

were also running short of food and other supplies nee-
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essary to carry out a successful attack. 46
With the arrival of the Eleventh Panzer Division,
Von Vormann decided that his Forty Seventh Panzer Corps
could once again carry out offensive operations.

Von

Vormann launched the Eleventh Panzer and Thirteenth Panzer Divisions through a gap in the Russian armies.

The

Germans turned west and then north and reached Zvenigorodka during the day on February 12th.

Von Vormann

reported that his corps had now reached a point only
thirty kilometers from the pocket and only twenty-five
kilometers from the Third Panzer Corps.~
Once more, von Vormann reported that his corps could
no longer carry out offensive operations.

The elements

and the Russians had again robbed his corps of any offensive capacity.
defended his gains.

He once again formed a hedgehog and
At this time, he tied down the for-

ces of the Fifth Guards Tank Army to his front and the
better part of a whole Front on his flanks. The Russians
sought to hold the German troops within the town and not
to let them join forces with the troops of Third Panzer
Corps."
Von Manstein ordered Third Panzer Corps to resume
their attack on February 12.

Brieth remained stalled

south of the stream, because rain and rising temperatures
during the day continued to hinder the trucks bringing
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supplies and ammunition to the forces of his spearhead. 49
With the supplies that managed to reach his corps,
Brieth forced the stream with Heavy Panzer Regiment Baeke
and the First SS Panzer Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler on
February 13.

His spearhead stopped late in the day due

to heavy snow and lack of supplies.

Brieth had forced

the stream crossing, but could move no further.

Brieth

had received only enough supplies to keep his spearhead
moving.

The supply system could not keep up with his

needs and he determined that he could only support the
remnants of Heavy Panzer Regiment Baeke and Leibstandarte
Adolf Hitler on the north side of the river.

At this

time, Baeke was down to his last six operational tanks.so
Late in the day on the 13th, as more supplies reached his
group, Brieth managed to force two more bridgeheads
across the Gniloy Tikich, including a bridge across the
stream which the First Panzer Division and elements of
the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler managed to seize intact. st
Consolidating the Pocket
At 01:30 on February 13, the Wallonien Brigade began
abandoning their forward positions around Derenkovez.
The Russians had already infiltrated their positions and
the men of the Wallonien had to face danger from all
round them.

Russian tanks arrived on the scene and Leon
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Degrelle utilized the last two of the brigade's anti-tank
guns to stop them.

The Russian tanks came to a halt and

the Russian infantry halted behind them.

The Wallonien

Brigade continued with their evacuation, even loading the
two anti-tank guns on the last of the trucks. 52
When the last of his men boarded the trucks, Degrelle contacted the Nordland Regiment and informed them
that the Wallonien had cleared their positions and were
falling back.

The Nordland Regiment set fire to what

was left of Ambrusino and took up new positions behind
the fire.n
Across the Stream
During the day on February 13, Brieth ordered the
rest of his corps to cross the Gniloy Tikich.

In order

to fully make use of all the divisions in his corps,
Brieth ordered the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Panzer Divisions, along with the 198th Infantry Divisions, which
protected the left flank of his corps, to take Hill 239.
Both divisions, the Seventeenth Panzer on the left, and
the Sixteenth Panzer on the right made good progress during the night on the Thirteenth and into the morning on
February 14.

By 10:30, the Seventeenth had taken all the

Russian trenches on the left approach to Hill 239.

The

Sixteenth broke through three Russian trench lines and

79

stormed Frankovka, near the base of the Hill.

The 198th

Infantry Division moved up behind the Seventeenth Panzer
Division and occupied the trench lines which the Russians
had just evacuated.

Both panzer divisions met tough res-

istance later in the morning and Brieth needed to add
some fighting power to his bid to take the hill.~
The Pocket Continues to Shrink
At dawn of February 14, the Wallonien Brigade stood
on the outskirts of Korsun.

At this point the Belgians

got down from their trucks and marched into the city, as
if on parade.

During the day, the Wallonien began bury-

ing the dead of the brigade.

Every man killed up to this

point in the pocket received burial at Korsun."
Russian planes made the German attempt to supply the
troops with parachute dropped supplies very difficult.
The German pilots had to slow down and fly at very low
altitudes in order to insure success.

The Russian pilots

would wait until the German pilots began their drop runs
and then dive on them from above, either shooting them
down when they pulled out of their dive, or while they
tried to complete their supply run.

The Germans stopped

the practice of dropping supply containers fitted with
parachutes because even when dropped from a low altitude
and in little wind, the parachutes tended to drift.

Many
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of the parachutes were carried so far off course, that
the troops within the pocket could not even pick them up.
Some drifted behind the Russian lines, while others ended
up in the Dnieper River.

Enemy ground fire made the ten

minutes it took to drop the canisters very difficult for
the pilots to survive the drop.~
According to Degrelle, the day the Belgians arrived
in Korsun, they witnessed a German airdrop.

At first,

the startled Belgians believed the parachutes belonged to
Russian airborne troops and prepared to meet their end,
but when the chutes hit the ground, they noticed thick
silver canisters attached to the chutes.

Each of the

canisters contained twenty-five kilograms of ammunition
and or little boxes of chocolate concentrate.

The troops

used the bitter chocolate to help them fight off sleep. 57
Later in the day, General Gille of the Wiking Division received news that Ambrusino had fallen.

He stormed

out of the command post, hopped into his volkswagen and
tore off in the direction of Ambrusino.

Under Gille, the

Wiking Division managed to retake the town and reestablished their protecting screen around Korsun. 58
One More Barrier
On February 14, Baeke and the Leibstandarte moved
off again in an attempt to take either the town of Dzhur-
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zhentsy or Hill 239, just six miles from the western most
point in the pocket.

Hill 239 commanded the ridgeline

just south of Dzhurzhentsy and was the highest point west
of the pocket.

Despite all attempts by the Germans, the

Russians managed to hold on to Hill 239 and the entire
ridgeline, all the way to Dzhurzhentsy.w
In order to stiffen resistance against the German
Third Panzer Corps, Marshall Zhukov moved the Fifth
Guards Tank Army into position to stop Brieth's advance.
The Fifth Guards Tank Army began their attacks against
Third Panzer late in the day on February 14.

Fifth

Guards Tank Army succeeded in slowing the German advance,
only ten kilometers from the men of Group Stemmermann.~
Toward Korsun
Colonel General Stemmermann ordered his group to
prepare for the final withdrawal from Korsun.

He no

longer had a large number of wounded in his hospitals at
Korsun and felt that further resistance against the
Russians trying to force him out of the city would cost
him too many men.

The 50,000 men of Group Stemmermann

which still survived were forced into an area that measured seven kilometers by eight kilometers. 61
Colonel General Wohler, the commander of Eighth
Army, ordered Stemmermann to prepare his group for a
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breakout.

His order stated that Group Stemmermann would

have to reach Dzhurzhentsy or Hill 239.

The message

further instructed him to mass all his artillery on the
breakout front in order to help force the Russian lines.
The order named Colonel General Theobald Lieb of FortySecond Corps as the commander of the assault force of
Group Stemmermann, and left Stemmermann to command the
rear guard.

Wohler ordered Stemmermann to begin his

breakout at 23:00 hours on February 16.fil
At 23:00 on February 14, the men of Group Stemmermann completed the evacuation of Korsun, in preparation for the coming breakout.

Winter had returned to

the Ukraine and instead of watery mud, the retreating
Germans had to deal with mud the consistency of putty.
Trucks that had move through the mud, became bogged down
and were pushed off the road by their former passengers.
Most of the soldiers abandoned their trucks, wished their
former drivers luck and made their way out of the pocket
on foot.s
New Innovations in the Airlift
After the problems associated with dropping canisters with parachutes to retard their descent failed,
the Germans tried dropping the supply canisters without
parachutes.

The planes had to reduce speed and fly at
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very low altitude to give the canisters a chance of surviving the impact.

The ammunition (seventy-five and

eighty-eight millimeter shells) had no problems surviving
the impact.

The low height and added cushion of the snow

guaranteed successful drops of ammunition.

The Germans

dropped gasoline in twenty-six point five gallon drums,
the most stable drums they could find.

On average, two

out of every ten drums burst on impact, but the Germans
within the pocket received most of the gasoline they
needed. 64
The Germans also decided to try to land their aircraft during the night.

The frosts at night allowed the

aircraft to land in relative safety, as long as they
could see the field.

In order to aid the pilots, the

ground crews parked trucks and cars along the sides of
the runway and when the planes came in, they started
flashing their headlights down the landing strip.

Land-

ing at night took away most of the need for escorting
fighters and made shooting down the German planes harder
for the Russian pilots. 65
Russian Reactions and the Russian Airlift
The Russians also made use of their night fighters,
to lessen the chances that German antiaircraft and
fighters would shoot down their planes.

Since many of
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the supply drops took place at night, the Russians had to
fly then to have any chance of interdicting supplies to
the pocket.

The Russian air commanders made extensive

use of Il-2 Shturmoviks fighters and Po-2 night bombers.M
The thaw caused the Russians to launch an airlift
effort of their own.

Fuel and ammunition supplies became

critically low in the formations fighting the German relief attempts now nearing the pocket.

The Russians as-

signed the task of supplying units of the Second and
Sixth Tank Armies to the 326 Night Bomber Air Division.
The Russians assigned this division the task, because
their airfields lay close to a railroad, which could
bring supplies directly to the airfield, negating the
need to send the supplies over road by truck.

This

division flew the Po-2 night bomber, making 822 flights
over a period of nine days, in very bad weather.

The

bombers managed to supply the two tank armies with fortynine tons of gasoline, sixty-five tons of supplies and
525 rockets.~
While the planes of the Second and Fifth Air Armies
supplied the troops and hindered German efforts to supply
the pocket, planes of the Seventeenth and Eighth Air Armies disrupted supply movements behind the German front
lines.

These air armies attacked German supply trains

and any vehicles that attempted to move towards the Ger-
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man front lines along the main highways in the area.

The

Soviets claim that on February 4, alone, they flew 117
sorties and destroyed one-hundred vehicles and carts
along with the men and material they carried. 68
The Final Supply Drops
When the area of the pocket became tenuously small,
the Germans initiated a new way of marking their positions.

Instead of marking the drop zones the planes were

to use, the Germans marked the four corners of the pocket.

As the German planes circled in the air, the men de-

fending the pocket fired flares into the air to mark the
sixty square kilometers where the planes were to drop the
supplies.

A successful drop meant that the men of the

pocket could defend themselves for that day. 69
During the last few nights of the existence of the
pocket, the Luftwaffe flew extra missions to insure that
the breakout forces would have adequate supplies to fight
their way to freedom.

On the night of February 13-14,

the Luftwaffe made their supply drop right on time, but
off target.

The supply drop that night fell into the

hands of the encircling Russian forces.

According to

Lieb, the fault lay with the Luftwaffe, the pilots misjudged their approach and just dropped their supplies in
the wrong area.

Lieb recorded in his diary the fact that
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the Luftwaffe tried to blame the forces within the pocket
for the errant supply drop, claiming that the encircled
forces had not adequately lit the drop zone.

In any

case, the men of Group Stemmermann received no supplies
for the night of the 13-14.~
To Take Lissyanka
Colonel General Brieth decided that he needed to
take a town closer to the pocket on the Gniloy Tikich
Stream, in order to better the chances of Group Stemmermann reaching his lines.

Brieth order the First Pan-

zer Division, along with the Seventeenth Panzer Division
to take the section of Lissyanka which lay on the eastern
bank of the Gniloy Tikich Stream.

The Germans stormed

the eastern section of town, but met considerable resistance from the Russian defenders.

Brieth then order the

Sixteenth Panzer to move into Lissyanka and the Germans
succeeded in taking the town.

After securing the eastern

half of Lissyanka, Brieth ordered the Sixteenth Panzer to
leave a regiment to guard the airfield there. 71
Final Preparations for the Breakout
In the early morning of February 15, the men of
Group Stemmermann stormed the village of Sanderovka, but
met determined Russian resistance after taking only half
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of the town.

During a later attack, the Germans with

several panzers managed to take the town, though with
extreme difficulty.TI
In order to increase the chance of a successful
breakout, Colonel General Stemmermann ordered that the
Wiking division hold the town of Novo-Buda, which
elements of the Second SS Panzer Division Das Reich had
taken during the night.

Two regiments of the Das Reich

Division had stormed the town and drove the Russians off
in surprise.

Das Reich captured twenty Ford trucks and

several Russian heavy artillery batteries.

The only

major usable road leading towards the relief forces
passed by Novo-Buda.

The Germans wanted to hold the town

in order to use it as a concentration area for the breakout and to protect the road they would use to leave the
pocket.

Novo-Buda also contained a fortified line the

Ukrainians had built for the Germans earlier in the war.
The 3,000 men of Das Reich moved off to take the next
town in the path of the breakout, turning Novo-Buda over
to the follow up forces of Group Stemmermann. 73
Stemmermann believed that a relatively small force
could hold the fortified line at Novo-Buda against a
sizeable force of Russians.

However, Hitler had not al-

lowed the fortified line to be started early enough and
several gaps remained when the Russians attacked the
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town.

The Wallonien Brigade, attached to the Wiking

Division, took part in holding the town.

The 1,000 men

of the Wallonien received support in holding the town
from a rag tag collection of cooks, accountants, drivers,
mechanics, quartermasters and telephone operators.~
At 05:00 on February 15, the Russians assaulted the
Belgian positions at Novo-Buda.

The German line held

where the fortifications stood, but Russian armored units
punched holes in the German lines where there was no
cover.

Fifteen Russian tanks supported the attacks,

which the Germans could counter with only five of their
own.

The five German Panthers retreated beyond the town

to take up new, more defendable positions.

During the

withdrawal, one of the German Panthers came gun to gun
with a Russian T-34 and the two tanks destroyed each
other.

Degrelle rallied the retreating Belgians south of

the town with the remaining Panthers.

He also succeeded

in gathering the last of the Belgian anti-tank guns to
help him hold their new positions.

The fall of the town

meant that the Russians now had a clear path to attack
the columns of Group Stemmermann as they moved down the
road and out of the pocket. 75
One group of Belgians under Lieutenant Colonel
Lucien Lippert, the last of the Belgian staff officers,
still held the northwest corner of the town.

He began an
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attack to retake the section of town lost to the Russians.

Lippert crossed into the Russian held southwest

corner of town and seized a group of houses near the center of town.

Lippert charged into a house in the Russian

section of town and was killed by the Russians defending
the position.

The Belgians retreated and tried to set up

new positions near the center of town.

The Russians then

launched an attack and drove the Belgians back into their
corner of town.n
The Belgians then requested permission to evacuate
the town entirely, citing heavy casualties and the presence of Russian tanks within the town proper.

Without

tank support in the town, the Belgians had to use their
hand portable anti-tank weapons to destroy the T-34's.
The Belgians made use of the panzerfaust, within the town
to knock out the tanks, but the weapon caused them many
problems.n
Stemmermann ordered the Belgians to hold the town at
all costs, at least until the breakout began.

Stemmer-

mann wanted to hold Novo-Buda, because men in this town
could protect the only road available to him to use in
his breakout attempt.

Only a muddy plain stood between

Novo-Buda and the escape route Group Stemmermann would
use to leave the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket.n
Colonel General Stemmermann assigned the capture of
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Sanderovka to General Gille of the Wiking Division.
Gille managed to free the Germania Regiment from his division's perimeter and assigned them the task of capturing the town.

Lieutenant Colonel Werner Meyer, the

commander of the Germania Regiment, decided to attack the
Russian lines to the left of the town, and then attack
the town from the right.

His first company stormed the

town and managed to force the Russians holding the town
to flee.

The second and third companies, which followed

up the attack, managed to hold the town until the breakout began. 79
Germania gained full control of Sanderovka early in
the morning of February 15.

During the day, the rest of

the Wiking Division passed through Sanderovka, and managed to force the Russians back three kilometers towards
the men of the Third Panzer corps. 80
Once again, the Third Panzer Corps tried to break
through the Russian lines to Group Stemmermann.

While

moving his troops forward, the bridge through Lissyanka
collapsed.

Brieth assigned his engineers the task of

building a new bridge through the town, while the rest of
his corps moved against Hill 239.

His attack broke down

due to the weather, and the Russian forces defending the
hill. 81

CHAPTER V
THE BREAKOUT
February 15-22, 1944
The Breakout Order
At 11:05, on February 15, Colonel General Stemmermann received the breakout order over the radio.

The

breakout order read, in part:
Capabilities of III Panzer Corps reduced by
weather and supply difficulties.
Task Force
Stemmermann must accomplish break-through on
its own to line Dzhurzhentsy-Hill 239 where it
will link up with III Panzer Corps. The breakout force will be under the command of Colonel
General Lieb and comprise all units still capable of attack. 1
Unfortunately for the corps within the pocket, the message never told the commanders of Group Stemmermann whether they would meet German or Russian forces upon reaching Hill 239.

The message also failed to tell Stemmer-

mann that Brieth had taken control of Lissyanka, or that
he had captured a bridge over the Gniloy Tikich.

These

omissions would cause serious problems for the troops
within the pocket as they escaped from the pocket. 2
Late in the evening on February 15, Stemmermann
called the division and regiment commanders together to
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give them his orders for the breakout.

He issued, in

part, the following orders:
At 23:00, on 16 February, Task Force B, 72nd
Division and 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking will
attack in a southwesterly direction from the
line Khilki-Komarovka, break the enemy's resistance by a bayonet assault, and throw him
back in continuous attack toward the southwest
in order to reach Lissyanka and there to join
forces with elements of III Panzer Corps.
Compass number 22 indicates the general direction
of the attack.
This direction is to be made
known to each individual soldier. The password
is:
"Freiheit" (Freedom).
For the attack and breakout each division will
be organized in five successive waves, as follows:
First Wave: one infantry regiment reinforced by one battery of light artillery (at
least eight horses per gun, plus spare teams)
and one engineer company. Second wave:
antitank and assault gun units. Third wave:
remainder of infantry (minus one battalion), engineers, and light artillery. Fourth wave:
all our wounded that are fit to be transported,
accompanied by one infantry battalion. Fifth
wave:
supply and service units.
The entire medium artillery and certain specifically designated units of light artillery
will support the attack. They will open fire
at 23:00 on 16 February, making effective use
of their maximum range.
Subsequently, all artillery pieces are to be destroyed in accordance with special instructions.
The radios of each division will be carried
along on pack horses. To receive signal communications from corps, each division will, if
possible, keep one set open at all times, but
in any event every hour on the hour. The corps
radio will be open for messages from the divisions at all times.
The corps command post will be, until 20:00, 16
February, at Shenderovka; after 20:00 at
Khilki.
From the start of the attack the corps
commander will be with the leading regiment of
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the 72nd Division. 3
Stemmermann covered the rear guard actions with special
care to make sure that his group received all the protection possible during the breakout.
coverage to the relief of the Wiking

He gave special

ss Division near

Komarovka by the 57th Infantry Division.

Most of the

staff officers of this division attended the meeting to
make sure that they knew each phase of the plan for relief of the

ss.

At this time, Stemmermann turned all

decisions dealing with the lead elements of the group to
Colonel General Lieb. 4
Soon after receiving command of the lead elements,
Colonel General Lieb had to make many decisions concerning the breakout attempt.

He went to talk to Colonel

General Stemmermann about what to do with the wounded men
that were too hurt to move.

Their transport could not

negotiate the muddy roads and even letting them try would
mean backing traffic up behind them when they became
bogged down in the mud.

Lieb decided that 2,000 of the

wounded men of the pocket would have to remain where they
were.

He called for the medical personnel of the pocket,

along with one doctor from each division to stay with the
wounded and surrender to the Russians when the time came. 5
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One More Supply Drop to the Pocket
The German pilots flew the greatest number of missions on the night of February 15-16, the night before
the breakout.

The crews flew an average of four to five

missions on that night alone.

The transports took extra

ammunition and gasoline supplies to the encircled men, to
aid them in their breakout attempt. 6

According to Lieb,

the air drops put them in good shape, at least well supplied with ammunition.

Lieb just worried about the abil-

ity of his corps to carry ammunition with them, because
of the conditions of the roads.

He doubted the ability

of the vehicles to move through the mud carrying full
loads of ammunition. 7
The missions to supply the men in the CherkassyKorsun Pocket ended on the night of February 15-16.

How-

ever, the mission to aid the men of the pocket continued
until the night of February 19-20.

The transports flew

missions to supply the relief forces, bringing their advance elements rations of food and ammunition to last
them until they returned to the German lines. 8
To Take Hill 239
During the day on February 16, Heavy Panzer Regiment
Baeke and the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler made one more
attempt to take Hill 239.

At one point in the day, Baeke
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actually managed to take three other tanks to the height
of the hill.

The four tanks were no match for the Rus-

sian counterattacks and they were again driven off the
hill and back 400 yards. 9
The Sixteenth Panzer Division launched an attack
against the Russian screening line in front of the
heights south of Dzhurzhentsy.

Seven T-34's and 400

supporting infantry stood in the first line facing the
Sixteenth Panzer.

This attack met with little success

and the Russians maintained control of the heights south
of the town, including Hill 239.

The second company of

the Sixteenth Panzer Division stood between the rest of
the division and Dzhurzhentsy, protecting the flank of
the division. 10
Heavy Panzer Regiment Baeke left the lines of Group
Stemmermann in Lissyanka and launched an attack against
the Russians at Oktyabr.

This move brought the men of

Third Panzer Corps closer to the men of Group Stemmermann.

It also gave the Germans a position north of the

Russians between them and the pocket.

Baeke then turned

the town over to flanking divisions and moved again
against the heights around Lissyanka. 11
The First Panzer Division brought their hospital
trains to a point directly behind the front lines of
Heavy Panzer Regiment Baeke during the day, in order to
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take the wounded from Group Stemmermann to Uman.

Ju.

52's stood by on a leveled field on the line of the retreat to take the wounded back to the airport at Uman. 12
The Final Orders
Further messages concerning the breakout attempt
reached Stemmermann during the day on February 16.

The

new instructions emphasized the importance of surprise
and coordination:
During initial phase of operation tonight hold
your fire so as to achieve complete surprise.
Maintain centralized fire control over artillery and heavy weapons, so that in the event of
stronger enemy resistance, especially at daybreak, they can be committed at point of main
effort in short order.a
The orders went on to give the time for the last expected
supply drop for the troops in the pocket and to tell
Stemmermann that he could expect air support at dawn, to
protect his flanks.M
General Gille summoned Degrelle from Novo-Buda and
informed him that Stemmermann planned to breakout of the
pocket at 23:00 that night.

Degrelle received orders to

hold Novo-Buda until all the elements of Group Stemmermann, except the rear guard, had passed his positions.
After Group Stemmermann moved past Novo-Buda, the Belgians would abandon their positions and march to the head
of the column to take part in spearheading the breakout
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attempt. 15
Final Preparations
The two corps in the pocket sought to breakout on
the night of February 16-17 1944.

Stemmermann ordered

that the artillery in the pocket fire off their remaining
rounds in support of the breakout effort.

The two corps

had no chance of moving their heavy artillery through the
mud to take them out of the pocket.

The prime-movers of

the guns had enough trouble moving through the mud
without a heavy gun to drag behind · them. 16
Stemmermann stationed Corps Detachment Bon the
northern flank of the breakout and the SS Wiking Division, with the Wallonien Brigade attached, in the
south.

Each division in the pocket placed a regiment of

artillery in the vanguard and echeloned two approximately
regiment sized artillery units behind the vanguard.
Stemmermann took command of the rearguard himself, leading the Fifty-Seventh and Eighty-Eighth Divisions as they
withdrew to each new phase line. 17
On the evening of February 16-17, the Leibstandarte
Adolf Hitler once again tried to cut their way through
the Russian defenses and take Hill 239.

In a separate

effort, they tried to take Hill 222, in order to help
protect the flank of the relief effort, as it returned to
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the German lines after linking up with Group Stemmermann.
These two key positions stood between the escaping men of
Group Stemmermann and the German lines.

The Germans were

unable to take the two hills, due to the ice and the tenacity of the Russians defenders.

The troopers of the

Leibstandarte at one point managed to seize the crest of
Hill 239, but were forced from the trenches they had just
taken by a Russian counterattack. 18
Heavy Panzer Regiment Baeke joined the Leibstandarte
Adolf Hitler in another attempt to take Hill 239.

Al-

though they made some headway, they were not able to take
the hill from the Russians.

Other units of Third Panzer

Corps took up screening positions around Pochapintsy, to
the south of Hill 239.

They took up these positions in

order to keep the Russians in the town from launching attacks against Group Stemmermann as it passed the Russian
concentrations in the town.

The attack into Pochapintsy

also served to scare off the Russians assigned to defend
the Gniloy Tikich Stream near the town.

In their retreat

they panicked the troops guarding the stream further
south and scared them into leaving their positions between the men of Group Stemmermann and the stream. 19
Shortly before the breakout began, a crisis arose
among the rear guard of Group Stemmermann.

The Russians

attacked the junction between the Fifty-Seventh and
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Eighty-Eighth Divisions.

The Russians tanks broke

through between these two infantry divisions because the
German divisions here had no tanks or sufficient antitank guns to stop the Russians.

General Gille of the

Wiking Division launched an attack with tanks and some of
his armored infantry.

The attack threw the Russians back

and reestablished the rear flank of Group Stemmermann.
The tanks and troops of the Wiking Division moved across
the whole of the pocket to take part in spearheading the
breakout attempt.w
Dash for Freedom
Group Stemmermann broke out of the Cherkassy-Korsun
Pocket at 23:00 on February 16.

At the time, Stemmermann

commanded about 45,000 men, including many Russian auxiliaries, the pocket also contained 1,500 wounded fit for
transport, which Stemmermann hoped could be rescued.
Stemmermann ordered the artillery not to fire until the
lead elements met resistance, so the breakout attempt
began in silence and the three assault regiments cut
through the Russian outpost line and the main screening
line before the Russians knew what happened. 21

Lieb, on

horseback, witnessed the events as they unfolded:
By 23:00 the regiment (105th Grenadier Regiment of the 72nd Infantry Division) two battalions abreast-started moving ahead, silently
and with bayonets fixed.
One-half hour later

100

the force broke through the first and soon
thereafter the second Russian defense line.
The enemy was completely caught by surprise.
Prisoners were taken along. n
Lieb noted the lack of defenders in the Russian lines and
was puzzled.

He later (after consulting members of the

rear guard over the radio) came to the conclusion that
the Russians had withdrawn a significant number of men
from their southern trench line to take part in the attack on Ssteblev, which they launched the morning of February 17. n
Along with the fighting, Lieb recorded the effect of
the elements on the breakout attempt.
The advance toward the southwest continued. No
reports from either Task Force Bon the right
or the 5th SS Panzer Division on the left.
That they were making some progress could only
be inferred from the noise of vehicles due
north and south of us, and from the sounds of
firing that indicated the location of their
leading elements. Over road-less, broken
terrain traversed by numerous gullies our march
proceeded slowly. There were frequent halts.
Here and there, men and horses suddenly disappeared, having stumbled into holes filled
with deep snow. Vehicles had to be dug out
laboriously. The slopes were steeper than
could be presumed from looking at the map.
Gradually the firing decreased until it broke
off entirely by 02:00. About two hours later
the leading elements of the 72nd Division were
approximately abreast of Dzhurzhentsy.
Still
no reports from Wiking and Task Force B.
I
could not give them my position by radio because by now my headquarters signal unit was
missing and could not be located.~
Lieb reported the same problems throughout the night that
Stemmerrnann would face, no communication with other ele-
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men ts of the group. 25
Later during the night another regiment of the
Seventy-Second Infantry Division reached a road running
into Dzhurzhentsy from the southeast.

The vanguard of

the regiment encountered four Russian tanks and a column
of trucks moving up the road.

One of the Germans yelled

"stoi" (halt) and the Russians allowed the Germans to
pass unmolested.

The Russians realized their mistake,

after German cannon began moving across the road, but
could not stop the vanguard, because they became heavily
embroiled with the follow up units. 26
The

ss spearhead regiment ran into trouble as it

passed east of Dzhurzhentsy.

There they encountered

heavy machine gun, antitank and tank fire from the edge
of the village.

General Gille diverted one battalion to

drive the Russians back and turned his main effort due
south.

His troops had charged across the open plain in

front of Dzhurzhentsy and Hill 239, thinking they would
meet fellow German troops there.

The Wiking Division

then came under fire from the Russians who still occupied
Hill 239.

Confusion reigned among the Wiking Division,

the unexpected fire from the hill threw the division into
confusion and allowed the Russians extra time to fire into the ranks of troops.

Gille then turned his men fur-

ther south to avoid the heavy tank fire coming from Hill
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239.

This placed the column east of the Gniloy Tikich,

and forced the column to cross the stream.v
The 72nd Division too, faced problems as it passed
through Dzhurzhentsy.

The Russians had stopped firing as

the regiment neared Dzhurzhentsy, but the Russians in the
area took up the battle again as the division left the
town.
Shortly after 04:00, enemy tanks ahead opened
fire.
They were joined by Russian artillery
and mortars operating from the direction of
Dzhurzhentsy, at first without noticeable
effect. The firing increased slowly but steadily, and was soon coming from the south as
well. We began to suffer casualties. The advance, however, continued. By about 06:00 the
leading units reached a large hollow southeast
of Dzhurzhentsy.
Enemy fire, getting constantly heavier, was now coming from three directions.
Elements of Wiking could be heard on
the left, farther back. No message, and not a
trace of Task Force B. Day was dawning. The
difficult ascent out of the hollow began. The
climb was steep and led up an icy slope.
Tanks, guns, horse-drawn vehicles, and trucks
of all kinds slipped, turned over, and had to
be blown up. Only a few tanks and artillery
pieces were able to make the grade. The units
lapsed rapidly into disorder.
Parts of the
Wiking Division appeared on the left.~
The Russians had chosen to defend Dzhurzhentsy, because
the town lay in a direct line with Lissyanka.

If the

Russians could force the men of Group Stemmermann to turn
south around the town, they would have to cross the
Gniloy Tikich Stream in order to make contact with the
Third Panzer Corps.~
While the men of the vanguard fought to reach the
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lines of Third Panzer Corps, Stemmermann kept order among
the remainder of his group.

He delayed the second wave

for ten minutes after the vanguard moved out, in order to
give the first wave time to pierce the Russian lines.

He

then ordered all vehicles other than tanks, self-propelled assault guns, tracked prime movers and enough horse
drawn carts to transport the men wounded during the
breakout destroyed.~
The destruction of the vehicles alleviated some of
the transportation problems, but the vehicles the Germans
utilized still caused monumental traffic jams.

Some

units chose to disregard Stemmermann's order to destroy
their trucks and tried to move them through the mud.
Others overloaded their wagons with wounded men and supplies, trying to save everything they possessed when the
Russians closed the pocket.

These trucks and overloaded

carts promptly got stuck in the mud and caused problems
for the vehicles behind them. 31
Sanderovka fell exactly one hour after the breakout
began.

Russian tanks stormed the town and overwhelmed

the Germans who were the rear guard of the column in this
area.

The Russian tanks then attacked the rear element

of the two columns.

The last twenty Panthers of the

Wiking Division shot out of the column and took positions
in a gully, bringing fire against the Russian tanks.
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These tanks, outnumbered ten to one, provided time for
Stemmermann to move his columns and for him to set up a
viable defense against the tanks with part of his infantry.32

According to the men who witnessed the tanks mov-

ing into battle, the tankers proudly wore their silver
trimmed uniforms and the black and silver "Ritterkreuz"
(knights cross to the iron cross) around their throats.
The last of the panzertroops of the Wiking Division died
to a man on the morning of February 17, defending the
rear guard of Group Stemmermann. 33
stemmermann kept his command post at Khilki, trying
to keep in contact with his subordinate commanders.

His

telephone lines had been severed during the night by moving tanks and troops, and had been shelled by the Russian artillery.

Stemmermann resorted to sending messages

by horsemen and by runner later during the night in order
to even keep control of the rear guard elements.~
Stemmermann ordered the two rearguard divisions to
withdraw to the second and third phase lines within three
hours of the start of the breakout.

At 00:30 hours,

Stemmermann followed the last wave of Corps Detachment B
out of Khilki and moved with his command group to set up
a new post at Dzhurzhentsy. 35
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Utter Chaos
Sometime during the move to Dzhurzhentsy, Stemmermann became separated from his command group and became lost.

Later during the night, an

ss soldier report-

ed that Stemmermann and his car had - been blown to pieces
by a Russian antitank shell. 36
Colonel General Lieb, at that time riding a horse
behind the last echelon of the Seventy-Second Infantry
Division, never heard of Stemmermann's fate until after
leaving the pocket.

Soon after passing Dzhurzhentsy, the

order among the breakout forces deteriorated rapidly.
The final phase of the breakout, turned into a wild surge
of men heading westward to freedom.n
The Belgians to the south of Lieb ran into problems
of their own during the breakout.

A wave of Russian

tanks hit the column from one of the rear flanks and began driving over the horse drawn carts carrying the wounded.

Without tank support, Degrelle led a group of his

Belgians to try to avert imminent catastrophe.

The Bel-

gians began pulling the undamaged carts out of the way
and taking as many of the walking wounded as possible
with them.

They consolidated the wounded on the undam-

aged carts and piled the rest of the carts in the road,
as a temporary barrier against the Russian tanks.

The

broken carts caught in the treads of the Russian tanks
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bringing many of them to a halt and created an impassable
bottleneck that stopped the rest of the Russian tanks behind them. 38
Degrelle and his Belgians, with the wounded in tow,
rounded a woods, leaving the Russian tanks behind.
this point, the Belgians began climbing a hill.

At

Across

the valley, hundreds of Cossack cavalry began urging
their horses down the opposite hill and into the rear and
flanks of the Belgians.

Three tanks charged down the

hill in front of the Belgians.

At first, the Belgians

thought the tanks were German, until they lowered their
guns and fired into the Belgian ranks.

Degrelle ordered

his men to follow him and fell fifteen meters into the
meter and a half of snow at the bottom of the slope and
buried himself in it.

The rest of the Walloons joined

him in the gully and waited for some miracle.

The mir-

acle came in the form of two Germans, each carrying a
panzerfaust.

Two Belgians grabbed the weapons and each

destroyed an enemy tank.

The Belgians charged across the

open plain towards the last of the three tanks.

The tank

charged through the Belgians and began destroying the
carts containing the wounded men.

The Belgians escaped

into the woods at the end of the plain and left the tanks
and the Cossacks behind them. The Russian tanks and cavalry could not follow the Belgians through the dense
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thickets of the woods. 39
At 01:00, the rear guard of Group Stemmermann began
disengaging platoon by platoon and leaving their positions in Novo-Buda.

At 05:00, the last platoon left

their final position in Novo-Buda and moved along the
route that the rest of Group Stemmermann had already passed.

These men had no problems following the trail, they

moved from burning wreck to burning wreck along the road
back to the German lines.~
The command group of Army Group South sat in their
command train at Uman awaiting news from Group Stemmermann.

At 01:25 hours on the morning of February 17,

von Manstein received news that first contact had been
made between the forces of Group Stemmermann and Third
Panzer Corps. 41
Lieb by-passed the Russian troop concentration around Dzhurzhentsy and mounted an attack against the
ridgeline southeast of Hill 239.
Between 07:00 and 10:00 the 72nd Division made
several attempts to mount a coordinated attack
toward the southwest.
It did not succeed. The
few guns and most of the tanks that were still
firing were soon destroyed by the enemy. Armored cars and motor vehicles suffered the same
fate.
Except for a few tanks that had managed
to keep up, there were now only soldiers on
foot and on horseback, and here and there a few
horse-drawn vehicles, mostly carrying wounded. 42
The first attempt at the ridgeline failed, but Lieb
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mounted others at different points along the ridgeline
looking for a weak point in the Russian lines.
In the protection of a ravine I was able to
collect a small force of about battalion size,
mainly stragglers from Task Force Band the
Wiking Division. With them I moved on toward
the line Hill 239-Pochapintsy, which was visible from time to time despite the heavy snowfall, and from where the enemy was firing with
great intensity. Russian ground support planes
appeared, opened fire, and disappeared again.
They were ineffective, and did not repeat their
attack, probably because of the difficult
weather conditions.
There was no longer any effective control;
there were no regiments, no battalions. Now
and then small units appeared alongside us.
I
learned that the commanding general of the 72nd
Division was among the missing. My corps staff
still kept up with me, but the aides who had
been sent on various missions did not find
their way back.~
Lieb witnessed first hand the break down of order in the
vanguard of Group Stemmermann.

His group still contained

fighting power, but he was struggling to assemble the
needed forces for the final attack.~
Lieb finally assembled enough men for a concentrated
attack against the ridgeline southeast of Hill 239.

He

led the assault, that finally broke through the Russian
lines.
During a lull in the firing I readied my battalion for the attack across the line Hill 239Pochapintsy which unfortunately could not be
bypassed. My staff and I were still on horseback. After leaving the draw that sheltered us
against the enemy, we galloped ahead of the
infantry and through the gaps between our few
remaining tanks. The enemy tank commanders,
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observing from their turrets, quickly recognized our intention, turned their weapons in
our direction, and opened fire.
About one-half
of our small mounted group was able to get
through.
From the eastern edge of the forest
south of Hill 239 came intensive enemy fire.
I
led my battalion in an attack in that direction
and threw the Russians back into the woods.
Rather than pursue them into the depth of the
forest, we continued advancing southwest, still
harassed by fire from the Russian tanks. 45
Lieb had finally broken through the last Russian line
standing between Group Stemmermann and the Gniloy Tikich.
Between 13:00 and 15:00 large groups of troops from the
three divisions in the vanguard {Wiking, 72nd Infantry
Division and Corps Detachment B} reached the bank of the
stream.

Only a handful of medium tanks reached the

stream, no heavy tanks or other heavy equipment managed
to make it that far.~
Lieb's group reached the stream at a point below
Lissyanka, where the stream was thirty to fifty feet
wide, had a rapid current and reached a depth of ten feet
in most places.

Heavy fire from the Russian tanks lo-

cated southeast of Pochapintsy forced the Germans into
the stream.~

Several of the officers tried to create an

emergency crossing using the carts which had made it to
the stream, but the current proved too powerful for the
few carts that had made it that far and they were swept
downstream."
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Crossing the Gniloy Tikich
By 16:00, the firing against the Germans on the
stream bank had ceased.

Lieb crossed the stream swimming

next to his horse and made his way to Lissyanka. 49

In

Lissyanka, he found the commander of the First Panzer Division and learned that there were now no more than one
company of armored infantry and three companies of tanks
of the First Panzer Division at Lissyanka.

One armored

infantry battalion consisting of two weak companies had
moved out of Lissyanka and established themselves at
Oktyabr.ffl
General Gille and the Wiking Division reached the
stream next.

He reached the Gniloy Tikich just south of

where Lieb had crossed earlier.

Gille had managed to

preserve the strength of his division to this point and
wanted to cross the stream with as many men as possible.
Gille ordered the artillery tractor to move into the
stream, to serve as a breakwater.

At this point, the

stream measured fifty meters across and had a very stiff
current.

Gille's hopes to cross the Gniloy Tikich down-

stream of the artillery tractor were dashed by the
stream, as the heavy current swept the tractor away. 51
The panje wagons carrying the wounded were then
shoved into the stream in masse, in hopes of building a
temporary bridge, but the wagons suffered the same fate
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as the artillery tractor.

Gille then singled out the

non-swimmers in the division.

He then began forming a

human chain across the river, alternating the swimmers
and non-swimmers.

Half-way across the stream, the third

man in the chain let go.

Most of the non-swimmers in the

chain were swept downstream, but the swimmers in the
chain managed to make the opposite shore.

Some of the

swimmers in the chain even managed to save the non-swimming man next to them. 52
Lieutenant Colonel Dorr arrived with the rearguard
of the division, dragging the wounded he found along the
way on poles and boards.

He also led a group of foot

soldiers of the 108th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the
Fourteenth Panzer Division, which had helped to protect
the wounded men who travelled with his group. 53

The men

of the Wiking Division used the poles and boards brought
by Dorr to move the wounded across the stream.

Gille

then sent his men across the stream in groups, with the
swimmers helping the non-swimmers across the stream.~
Final Preparations for the Belgians
Degrelle assembled his men in a forest three kilometers to the southwest of Lissyanka.

The forest pro-

vided his Belgians and the few thousand Germans traveling with him protection from the Russian tanks and
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cavalry which had harassed his group since it left the
pocket.

Several hundred men lay in the snow outside of

the forest pinned down by heavy machine gun fire. 55
Degrelle found a French speaking soldier among the
Germans and asked for volunteers among all the men with
him to attempt to rescue the soldiers pinned down in the

snow.

Degrelle organized the volunteers into ten men

combat teams, with a Walloon in each to act as an interpreter and messenger.

He used the combat teams to form a

square around the forest until nightfall when he would
attempt to rescue the men pinned down, and make the last
break for freedom toward Lissyanka. 56
From the woods, Degrelle studied the valley beyond.
A column of Russian tanks sat on a hill three-hundred
meters away facing the woods in which the Belgians sought
refuge.

The hill provided the Russian tanks with a com-

manding view of the valley the Belgians needed to traverse to reach Lissyanka.

Degrelle observed that one

group of Russian tanks was firing on another of the escape groups in the next valley. 57
Degrelle moved from position to position ordering
his men to stay within the tree line and not to move from
their positions until the tanks moved on.

Degrelle man-

aged to control his Belgians, but some of the Germans
with him charged into the valley under the guns of the
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tanks.

Not one of the Germans managed to cross the val-

ley under the withering fire from the Russian tanks and
infantry which appeared among the tanks just after the
Germans left the woods.

The Russian infantry then

charged into the mass of dead and dying men cutting off
their fingers to take the rings off the German soldiers.
The Belgians took no action against the Russian infantry,
Degrelle had ordered them not to fire, because their fire
would have only given away their positions, it could not
have helped the wounded men.Y
From the woods, Degrelle witnessed the Russian tanks
bringing their guns to bear on another group of German
soldiers charging through the next valley.

An even lar-

ger group of soldiers began crossing the plain to the
southeast of the forest trying to reach Lissyanka.

De-

grelle decided to follow the group moving to the southeast toward Lissyanka, but decided to wait for nightfall
to give his men the best chance possible of reaching the
town.

He wished to spare his troops a trip across the

Gniloy Tikich Stream, in the fifteen to twenty degree
below zero weather.B
While waiting for total darkness, the noncommissioned officers among the Belgians began rounding up the
men in the forest to make the final break to cross the
stream.

The Belgians also rounded up the thirty Russian
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prisoners they brought with them out of the pocket.

The

Russian prisoners had just run along with the Belgians
fearing death at the hands of the Cossack Cavalry and
Russian tanks more than the Belgians who had captured
them.

The Belgians also sheltered many Ukrainian civil-

ians in the woods with them.

Among them, many blond

haired blue eyed women who did not wish to fall under
Russian control again for fear of the abuse at the hands
of the average soldiers and Asian Russians.

The Belgians

had also managed to save a number of their walking wounded and even some of the men who were confined to the
carts, who were now shivering with cold and fever.

De-

grelle wished to take all the soldiers and other groups
in his charge out of the forest, and across the stream to
freedom.w
The Belgians moved from the woods under cover of
darkness and moved toward the marshes to the southeast.
They moved along a path their scouts had marked earlier
in the night with white stakes.

Degrelle then formed his

men to cross the stream, utilizing a wide beam they had
brought with them out of the forest. 61

Four of the best

swimmers in the Wallonien Brigade swam across the stream,
supporting the makeshift stretcher carrying the body of
their slain commander, Lieutenant Colonel Lucien Lippert.62

Just after crossing the stream, the Belgians came
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to the first German outpost.fil
Lissyanka
The rear guard moved according to plan and crossed
the lines of Third Panzer Corps, as planned, even before
many of the groups which had left the pocket ahead of
them.

They made use of the bridge which First Panzer and

the Leibstandarte held and suffered none of the losses
the other groups suffered while crossing the Gniloy Tikich Stream.

The rear guard rejoined the rest of Group

Stemmermann after passing through Lissyanka.M
While in Lissyanka, Lieb received word that a reinforced regiment of Corps Detachment B had driven into
the town from the north.

The commander of this group re-

ported that the commander of Corps Detachment B had been
killed in action.

He received more distressing news from

the Chief of Staff of Eleventh Corps:

"Eleventh Corps

had lost contact with Colonel General Stemmermann during
the morning, while marching on foot to Dzhurzhentsy".
Lieb also received the report that the rear guard had
crossed the Gniloy Tikich, and would soon join him in
Lissyanka. 65
Lieb assumed command of Group Stemmermann after receiving word of Stemmermann's disappearance.
his situation in his diary:

He recorded
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The 72nd and Wiking Divisions were completely
intermingled. No longer did they have any
tanks, artillery, vehicles, or rations. Many
soldiers were entirely without weapons, quite a
few even without footgear.
Neither division
could be considered in any way able to fight.
One regiment of Task Force B was intact and
still had some artillery support. However,
this regiment also had no vehicles and no rations left. All wounded, estimated at about
2,000 were being gradually sheltered in the
houses of Lissyanka, and later were evacuated
by air.~
Out of three divisions, one regiment remained battle worthy.

Lieb had other men who retained the ability to

fight, but for the most part, his corps was no longer fit
for battle, but he had reached the lines of the relief
effort and now the only thing left to accomplish was the
withdrawal to the main German lines on the Bug River. 67
Colonel General Brieth appraised Lieb of the situation his corps faced and that he lacked gasoline for his
vehicles and extra weapons or supplies for Group Stemmermann.

His front line troops had enough food to get

by, but absolutely no extra rations.

Brieth had been

forced to assume a defensive posture around Lissyanka, in
order to fend off the Russian attacks which were increasing in potency as well as frequency.

Lieb immediately

requested supply by air and evacuation of his wounded.
He also requested that vehicles and weapons be brought up
from the rear areas to the main rescue area, just west of
Lissyanka, for his men.~
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During his stay in Lissyanka, Degrelle heard of the
Russian news releases that announced the complete and total destruction of Group Stemmermann.

According to the

men of Third Panzer Corps, the Russians began transmitting the news of the destruction of Group Stemmermann
just after the fall of Korsun.

The Russian commanders

decided that they would destroy Group Stemmermann before
it could reach the lines of Army Groups South and bring
some truth to their communiques. 69
The March Back to the German Lines
Since Third Panzer Corps had no extra vehicles for
the transportation of his men, Lieb once again issued
orders for the men of Group Stemmermann to march westward.

Group Stemmermann reached the main rescue area in

the afternoon on February 18.

Renewed Russian attacks

against the flanks and rear of Third Panzer Corps forced
the Germans to withdraw further the following day. 70
During the time the combined forces of Group Stemmermann and the Third Panzer Corps returned to the main
lines of Army Group South, the German air force delivered
supplies to them at airfields set up along the route.

On

the return trips from supplying the men of the relief
forces, the transport planes picked up 2,000 wounded men

from the pocket and relief forces.

The Germans had
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reconnoitered two landing strips along the retreat route.
The wounded were taken to the hospitals around the airport at Uman.

Men who were too tired to march, were

taken to the airstrips to await transport to Uman. 71
The Russians attacked the Sixteenth Panzer Division
in regimental strength, hoping to take the airfield the
division held.

The Russians attacked in the midst of a

blizzard and managed to get closer to the German lines
than would have been possible on a clear day.

The Ger-

mans fought off the Russian attack and managed to hold
the field until the wounded men of Group Stemmermann
could be flown out.n
The men of Group Stemmermann and Third Panzer Corps
set off towards the German lines of Army Group South.
The Russians continuously shelled the column on the way
back to the German lines.

With Tiger and Panther tanks

to protect them, the men of Group Stemmermann moved with
much less difficulty.

The tanks would charge towards the

haystacks along the route and flush out the Russian infantry hiding behind them.

The tanks would then herd

them along with the column.n
The men of Group Stemmermann marched many miles before they came upon the first of the supply depots.

The

Germans had brought up extra field kitchens to help feed
the men along the route.

According to Lieutenant De-
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grelle, forty thousand men of Group Stemmermann had come
this far and they were all hungry and thirsty.

One or

two thousand men would "beseige" one of the field kitchens and fight for the front of the line and food.

The

unlucky cooks at the field kitchens risked being tumbled
back into their fire and pots by the hungry men. 74
During the advance toward the German lines, the men
of Group Stemmermann could see the cost of the advance of
Third Panzer Corps.

Degrelle counted some 800 Russian

and 300 German tanks destroyed along the route.

He also

observed some of the rocket launchers the Germans referred to as "Stalin's Organs" abandoned in the snow, some
still brandishing their double rows of rockets. 75
The thaw which had hindered movement within the
pocket had also hindered the movement of the relief
forces.

During the time of the breakout though, winter

had returned to the Ukraine bringing snow and gale force
winds, freezing the mud around the treads of the tanks.
The men of Group Stemmermann and Third Panzer Corps needed to keep the tanks going to help insure the success of
re-turning to the lines of Army Group South.

First, the

tankers needed to light small fires under the gas tanks
and engines of their tanks, to bring the gasoline and engines up to operating temperatures.

The tankers then cut

the snow around their treads with axes and poured
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gasoline under the treads.

The men of Group Stemmermann

lit fires around the tanks to help thaw the mud enough to
allow the tanks to move.%
Early in the day on February 20, the storm broke and
the men of Group Stemmermann moved along unhindered by
the weather.

The artillery which had plagued them since

leaving the pocket ceased, as the corridor through which
they were travelling grew wider.

The Germans now began

to sort out the men, which had arrived all mixed together.

The Germans from the rear areas of Third Panzer

Corps held placards in the air with the names and numbers
of each division of Group Stemmermann.

The Germans even

demanded order within the divisions and separated the men
of Group Stemmermann down to their companies and even to
platoons.n
On February 20, Lieb felt that he had dealt with all
the major problems facing Group Stemmermann.

The supply

situation had been dealt with and his men were now
receiving much needed transportation and weapons.

Lieb

received instructions from O.K.H. to proceed to headquarters in East Prussia.

A Fieseler Storch arrived, taking

Colo-nel General Lieb, General Gille and Lieutenant Degrelle, first to East Prussia and later to Berlin to meet
with Hitler.n
The Russians began assaults against the German po-
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sitions around Frankovka.

The men of the Pioneer Bat-

talion of the Sixteenth Panzer Division fought off the
assaults all through the day and into the night.

In the

mist of the early morning of February 22, the Russians
launched a massive attack and managed to take the town.
The Seventeenth Panzer Division assaulted the town and
managed to retake it from the Russians after heavy attacks.

The Germans also managed to take Hill 239.

Al-

though the hill was now to their rear, the Germans wished
to hold it, because from the hill the Russians could fire
on the Germans still in the section of Lissyanka on the
east bank of the Gniloy Tikich Stream.

With no more ob-

stacles in their way, the men of the Third Panzer Corps,
and Group Stemmermann fought their way back to the German
lines on the Bug River.~
Conclusions
Von Manstein received word later that between 30,000
and 32,000 men escaped from the encirclement.

Von Man-

stein regretted only that most of the wounded had to be
left in the pocket. 80

Many of the groups brought out

wounded men, but many of the trucks the wounded needed
for transportation stuck fast in the mud. 81

Only the

shock units, such as the SS Wiking Division and the Wallo(

n Assault Brigade of Group Stemmermann suffered
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heavy losses.

Between the six divisions and the attached

brigade, Group Stemmermann suffered some 8,000 casualties
during the breakout. 82
The mud also caused the loss of most of the heavy
equi_pment in the pocket.

Only 1,000 of the 15,000 vehic-

les in the pocket made the trek through the mud.

The men

of Group Stemmermann destroyed all the vehicles left to
them on the night of the breakout that could not travel
through the mud.

The men of Group Stemmermann managed to

extricate the vehicles they managed to bring with them
out of the pocket only through "superhuman" effort. 83
According to one Russian source, the First and Second Ukrainian Fronts encircled and destroyed nine infantry, one panzer division, a motorized brigade, engineer
units and a sizable force of artillery.

This encircle-

ment ended the German presence on the Dnieper River and
forced the Germans to retreat as far as the Bug River, in
some cases. 84
Russian claims for the German losses in the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket exceed the number of men the Germans
claim were there.

The Russians claim 55,000 dead and

18,000 prisoners.

For equipment losses, the Russians

claim 500 tanks, 300 planes and most of the German artillery, including all the heavy artillery pieces. 85

The

Russians do concede the fact that the Germans managed to
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extricate 3,000 men from the pocket by air.

The Russians

claim that only the officers and the lead elements of the

ss managed to escape.

They believed that only 3,000 men,

due to the blizzard like conditions on the night of the
breakout, managed to escape.

The Russians state that

Colonel General Lieb, General Gille and Lieutenant Degrelle boarded a plane during the breakout and escaped
from the encirclement by leaving their men to their fate.
According to the Russians, the Germans inflated the number of escapees to lessen the demoralizing impact on
their men.

The Russians go on to claim that the loss at

Cherkassy Korsun had a very demoralizing effect on all
the other units of the German army in the Ukraine. 86
By examining the number of survivors from each
group, the German claim comes closer to the truth.

The

105th regiment of the 72nd Infantry Division came out of
the pocket with three officers and 216 men, out of 1062
encircled.

General Gille of the Wiking Division lead

4,500 men of his division out of the pocket, seventy percent of his divisional strength when the Russians formed
the pocket.

General von Trowitz led his Bavarian 57th

Infantry Division and the remains of the 389th Infantry
Division to freedom, bringing 3,000 men of the rear guard
out of the pocket.

Trowitz also brought 250 wounded men

out of the pocket with him, men Stemmermann had reluc-
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tantly ordered left in the pocket.

Lieutenant Leon De-

grelle, the leader of the Wallonien Brigade brought 632
of his Belgians out of the pocket, along with 3,000 other
men. 87

The Russians claim that only one percent of the

men escaped. 88

Von Manstein ordered that the men of Group

Stemmermann go into the reserve areas in Poland.

Before

Group Stemmermann moved to the rear, von Manstein personally visited the men who escaped from the pocket.

Ar-

my Group South had to hold their front, now minus the six
and a half divisions the Russians almost destroyed in the
Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket.

He managed to save the men, but

had to give them a chance to rest and refit before putting them back into the line. 89

CHAPTER VI
IN RETROSPECT
German and Russian Conclusions
On the Airlift
After the return· of Third Panzer Corps and Group
Stemmermann to the lines of Army Group South, both sides
drew their conclusions on the successes and failures during the Cherkassy-Korsun encirclement.

The Germans man-

aged to save most of their men, but saw valuable lessons
about holding territory that had no military value, against very superior forces.

But, the Germans failed to

act on most of their lessons and continued to follow Hitler as a military leader.

The Russians drew many differ-

ent lessons from the encirclement, but many of their conclusions could not be put to use, because they failed to
accept the truth about what the Germans actually managed
to accomplish in their attempt to free their trapped comrades.

Both sides should have drawn lessons relating to

operations with encircled forces and about airlifts to
troops on isolated battlefields.
From January 31, to February 18, 1944, Soviet Air
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Force sources claim that 210 sorties were flown against
the German airfields used to supply the Cherkassy-Korsun
Pocket.

Further, they claim that they fought seventy-

five air battles over the airfields, Korsun within the
pocket and the three airfields the Germans flew from to
supply the pocket.

The Soviets claim that German losses

during the attacks on airfields for this period amounted
to 200 planes, of which 125 were destroyed on the ground,
they also claim to have damaged a significant number of
planes on the ground, and in the air. 1
According to the reports from the commanders of the
German air transport wings, thirty-two Junker Ju-52
transport planes were lost due to enemy action, technical
failures and weather conditions, a significantly smaller
number than claimed by the Russian sources.

Russian

anti-aircraft fire and fighters damaged one-hundredthirteen more Junker Ju-52 transports, bu~ the Germans
claim to have flown these later during the operation,
after the ground crews repaired them.

The Germans pro-

vide no numbers for aircraft lost on the ground when
their airfields came under attack and do not even mention
attacks against airfields outside the pocket.

They do

concede losses on the ground at Korsun, but count these
losses in the number of planes lost to enemy action, and
damaged during the fighting. 2
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The men in the pocket complained several times that
they lacked sufficient supplies to carry out their daily
operations.

Although at times the men ran out of food

and the supply of ammunition became critically low, the
airlift managed to keep the men in the pocket supplied
with enough ammunition and food to successfully break out
of the pocket.

The men in the pocket were able to alle-

viate the food problem by trading certain items with the
Russian peasants for their livestock.

The German offi-

cers talk of the trades, but maintain that the German
troops gave the Russians peasants something of value in
exchange for the livestock they received from them.
The Germans can count the airlift to CherkassyKorsun as one of the few successful airlifts to encircled
forces during World War II.

The planes managed to deliv-

er 2,026 tons of supplies to the troops in the pocket
during the twenty days they flew missions into the pocket.3

The transports also managed to extract 2,825 wounded

men during the first week of the pocket.

When added to

the 2,000 men the transports picked up along the lines of
the retreat, the Luftwaffe managed to save 4,825 of the
encircled men from death at the hands of the Russians or
life in Russian captivity.

The fact that so many men

were saved by the Luftwaffe would tend to cast doubt on
the Russian claim that the German officers ordered the
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men of the

ss to slaughter and then burn the wounded men

that could not march along with the column, instead of
surrendering them into the "care" of the Russian troops. 4
The Russian airlift during the Cherkassy-Korsun
Pocket was successful as well.

The Russians were able to

supply their two tank armies, which ran out of supplies
during the encirclement operation and keep them on the
move and fighting.

The loss of the two tank armies could

have compromised the hold the Russians had on the pocket
and would have seriously hampered the operations against
Third Panzer Corps.

The airlift supplied the tank armies

with 114 tons of supplies and 525 rockets.

The airlift

negated the need for the Russians to move their supplies
by rail, or across mud choked roads which hindered the
movement of trucks and moved the supplies faster than
would have been possible by using any other means of supply available to them. 5
The German airlift succeeded in keeping the men of
Group Stemmermann supplied during the time the Russians
held them in the pocket and on their trip back to the
main lines of Army Group South.

Although the men in the

pocket complained several times that they never received
enough supplies, the German air force delivered enough
supplies to keep them alive and to allow them to fight
off the Russians.

The air force met or exceeded the
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goals which the German High Command set.

These goals

were for the average expenditures of ammunition and food
of a group the size of Group Stemmermann in the field for
a day and were established based on the strength of Group
Stemmermann at the beginning of the encirclement.
Group Stemmermann wanted a higher tonnage of supplies delivered daily.

The group would naturally wish to

have more than the average expenditure of supplies delivered for a days worth of fighting, in case they had a
harder than average day in the field.

But in evaluating

the airlift, one must ask what makes a successful airlift:

delivering enough supplies to kill every one of

your enemies facing you, or delivering enough supplies to
guarantee the survival of the group you are supplying?
German Conclusions
The Germans drew many lessons from the encirclement
near Cherkassy-Korsun.

Although the German Army came to

many conclusions concerning the encirclement, the Russians and later the Americans managed to encircle large
portions of the German Army.

The later encirclements all

came about for the same reasons the Germans were trapped
at Cherkassy, because Hitler issued orders to save the
land he had captured and not to guarantee the existence
of his armies. 6
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The first lesson came from the realization that the
circumstances leading to the pocket only came about because the High Command (Hitler) insisted that von Manstein hold Cherkassy.

Even after the High Command real-

ized the full extent of the danger the two corps faced,
they waited to give the breakout order until the Russians
held strong positions around the entire pocket.

Each day

the breakout was delayed, the Russian forces encircling
the pocket grew stronger while the German forces within
the pocket grew weaker.

The Germans lost all their heavy

equipment within the pocket because they were forced to
stay in their positions on the Dnieper River instead of
being able to withdraw when their commanders thought it
necessary. 7
Although the two corps within the pocket belonged to
different armies, Hitler placed the entire command and
control of the forces within the pocket under one man,
Colonel General Stemmermann.

However, Hitler insisted

that two separate corps from two different armies carry
out the relief attempt.

The absence of unity of command

also made itself felt at the army level because the pocket force came under the command of Eighth Army, while the
third Panzer Corps belonged to First Panzer Army.

The

two army commanders needed to stay in constant communication to find out what each force was doing and the
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progress each relief attempt was making.

A unified com-

mand, over both the forces of the pocket and the relief
forces, would have greatly reduced the problems the
breakout force faced.

A commander over a unified force

would have known of the deviation in course Colonel General Lieb made around Dzhurzhentsy.

He could then have

notified Third Panzer Corps of the need to meet them in
another place and thus avoided the fiasco of the Gniloy
Tikich Stream crossing. 8
The plan for the breakout also failed to allow
enough freedom of action at the time the two corps were
to meet.

Hitler ordered Third Panzer Corps to occupy the

high ground around Hill 239 on February 17 and tie down
the strong Russian forces standing between Group Stemmermann and freedom.

The failure of Third Panzer Corps to

take Hill 239 allowed the Russians to concentrate their
full weight against the forces of Group Stemmermann emerging from the pocket.

A commander with full freedom

of action could have issued order to guarantee the meeting point of the two groups at a place where the Russians
did not have a large enough concentration of troops to
beat off any attacks mounted against them.

Brieth could

have changed the direction of his attack and met Lieb as
he led his men around the Russian concentrations on the
high ground near Hill 239.

Brieth would also have been
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able to move his forces to the Gniloy Tikich Stream at
the point Lieb decided to force a crossing.

A meeting of

the forces would have meant that the men lost in crossing
the Gniloy Tikich might have had a chance to make it
across the stream. 9
The High Command also failed to guarantee sufficient
support for the breakout.

Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe

to stand ready to support the breakout effort at dawn on
the February 17, if Lieb contacted them.

The Luftwaffe

had been given no instructions to act on their own, or
what to do if Lieb could not contact them.

Lieb faced e-

nough problems during the breakout, just trying to keep
control of his own men and preserve the fighting strength
of his group.

He could not worry about directing air

support against every concentration of Russian troops
that his men ran across.

The High Command never made

provisions to allow the Luftwaffe to support the breakout, by attacking the Russian concentrations around the
pocket.

No provisions were made for the Luftwaffe to

support the attack of Third Panzer Corps against Hill
239.

Hitler also failed to use the Luftwaffe in a recon-

naissance role, which could have alerted Third Panzer
Corps as to the location of Group Stemmermann and could
have helped in insuring that the two groups meet in a
place of safety and not near the concentrated group of
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Russians around Hill 239. 10
The situation with Eleventh Panzer Division presents
quite a puzzle.

Hitler held the division up, until too

late to help Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps make good early
progress.

Then when Hitler did release the division, he

still sent it to the stalled Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps.
Von Vormann had already reported that he was down to only
twenty-seven functioning tanks and thirty assault guns
and that all he could do now was hold the Russian Front
attacking him.

Instead of sending a fresh panzer divi-

sion to support a failed attack, Hitler might have ordered Eleventh Panzer to join in the attack of Third Panzer
Corps which was still making some headway towards the men
of Group Stemmermann and which had come to a point closer
to the pocket than the Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps had
reached when Eleventh Panzer joined in the relief attempt.
Hitler violated "mass", the first law of military
operations, which calls for assembling enough troops at
the crucial spot, in order to reach their goal.

Hitler

divided his relief force into two groups, even though his
generals protested the division.

His generals believed

that as one force the relief attempt had a chance, but in
two groups, they could not reach the troops within the
pocket.

History proved his generals right, the two
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groups did not succeed in reaching the pocket and this
failure forced the men of Group Stemmermann to fight
their way out of the pocket themselves.
Hitler wanted two groups, so that he could trap the
Russians in an encirclement of his own.

By trying to

trap the Russians, Hitler violated "objective", thesecond law of military operations.

Hitler should have

sought to achieve only the relief of the troops within
the pocket, the original objective of the relief attempt.
He changed the objective of the relief force, to trying
to encircle the Russians between Army Group South and
Group Stemmermann.

The few forces available to the re-

lief attempt could not achieve both of the objectives
Hitler set for them and ultimately failed in both objectives.
Hitler forced the German soldiers of Army Group
South to endure the encirclement at Cherkassy-Korsun.
Hitler refused to listen to the advice of his generals
and withdraw from the area.

The generals knew that Army

Group South could no longer carry out offensive operations, but Hitler refused to listen.

He chose not to

heed the advice of men with many years of military experience behind them and chose to make the disastrous decision for himself.

This decision which cost Army Group

South the use of the two corps within the pocket and the
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use of the two corps employed in the relief attempt.

The

Germans had to send these units into the rear areas for a
rest and refit.

CHAPTER VII
PROMISES, THREATS, CANDY AND CIGARETTES
Russian Propaganda at Cherkassy-Korsun
The Free Germany Committee
During their attempt to liquidate the CherkassyKorsun Pocket, the Russians began three propaganda campaigns.

One addressed all the soldiers in the pocket,

the second dealt solely with the Freewilling Volunteers
of the SS and the third dealt with the German troops in
the front lines in Russia.

The Russians wished to make

the Freewilling volunteers rethink their reasons for
joining the German armies and hopefully get them to stop
fighting and go home.
non-Germans of the

ss

The Russians also tried to get the
to join the allied cause and fight

on the side of the French troops in the Anglo-American
armies.

The Russian commanders sought to use their vic-

tory at Cherkassy-Korsun to demoralize the men in the
German front lines in the East.

The Russian propaganda

campaign proved inept against the Germans in Army Group
South, mainly because the Russians used lies to try to
get the German troops to desert.
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The Russian commanders
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and the men of the National Committee for a Free Germany
and League of German Officers in Captivity tried many
means to elicit the surrender of the men within the pocket and to make the volunteer

ss

divisions desert their

German allies and later tried to use their victory to demoralize the whole German Army, but all their attempts
ended in failure.
The inception of the Free Germany Committee and the
League of German Officers came at a dark moment for the
German Army.

The two groups came into existence when

Sixth Army was going through it's death throes at Stalingrad.1
Sixth Army had been in the front lines since the beginning of the war.

It had fought with distinction in

Poland, France and during the first two years of the campaign against Russia. 2
came at Stalingrad.

The final deployment of Sixth Army

Hitler employed Sixth Army to pro-

tect the flanks of Fourth Army in their drive to the Caucasus.

The Russians encircled Sixth Army at Stalingrad

and sought to eliminate the Germans in the town.

Hitler

ordered the five corps staff and twenty two combat divisions of Sixth Army to hold Stalingrad at all cost and to
wait for a relief effort to break through to them. 3

The

relief attempt to free Sixth Army at Stalingrad ultimately failed and the Russians destroyed the army.

Field
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Marshal von Paulus, the commander of Sixth Army surrendered to the Russians, he became the first German Field
Marshal to surrender his command.

The losses for sixth

Army at Stalingrad included 150,000 dead or missing and
90,000 prisoners. 4
The Soviets realized that the men of Sixth Army offered new possibilities for their propaganda campaign against Germany.

These men could attest to the fact that

Hitler would allow the soldiers of Germany and her allies
to die for land.

The Russians needed the men of Sixth

Army, because all prior attempts aimed at undermining the
fighting power of the Wehrmacht in the east had failed. 5
The Free Germany Committee and League of German Officers
were formed of the men captured at Stalingrad and also
contained many of the men who had sought political asylum
in Russia.

The two groups merged and worked together to

strengthen their movements and gain respect among their
new Russian comrades. 6
The League of German Officers in Captivity first
sought new recruits in the prisoner of war camps designated for officers.

Their recruitment was limited to the

camps at Yelabuga, Oranky, susdal and Camp 150. 7

The

League of German Officers consisted of nineteen men after
their recruitment campaign. 8
Members of the National Committee for a Free Germany
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went into the camps of the enlisted men.

The men of the

League of German Officers directed the work of the Free
Germany Committee, but stayed out of the recruitment process.9

Twenty five men in all joined the National Commit-

tee and both groups worked on turning the rest of the
German prisoners against Nazi Germany, hoping to make
them pro-Communist. 10
The men of the Free Germany Committee and the League
of German Officers then began to take their message to
the troops in the German front lines.
the day read:

Their slogan of

"Orderly withdrawal to the frontiers of

the Reich." 11
The Tehran Conference seemed to mean the end of the
Free Germany Committee and the League of German Officers.
At Tehran, the Allies agreed that the only peace with
Germany would be an unconditional peace.

The Allies also

used this conference to determine the spheres of influence they would have in Germany. At Tehran, they carved
Germany into the zones that they controlled after the
war.

The conference meant that the Free Germany Commit-

tee and the League of German Officers could no longer
fight for the return of German troops to the borders of
Germany.

The Russians still believed they could use the

German prisoners of war though.

The Russians believed

that the Free Germany Committee and the League of German
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Officers could still reinforce their propaganda.

They

also believed that if the Wehrmacht revolted against
Hitler, that their officers might pave the way for an
understanding with the revolting officers of the Wehrmacht.12
The Committee at Cherkassy-Korsun
The first real test of the propaganda value of the
Free Germany Committee and the League of German Officers
occurred at Cherkassy-Korsun.

The men in the Cherkassy-

Korsun Pocket faced the same situation that the founders
of the Committee and League faced at Stalingrad, but here
the propaganda met with utter failure. 13
On January 31, 1944, Colonel General Alexander Shcherbakov arrived at the dacha the Russians had provided for
Colonel General van Seydlitz, the leader of the League of
German Officers in Captivity.

Scherbakov headed the Po-

litical Administration of the Red Army as a member of the
Soviet War Cabinet, also known as the Council of Five.
The Fact that Scherbakov went to the meeting with van
Seydlitz shows the importance of the meeting.~
Shcherbakov informed van seydlitz of the German situation at Cherkassy and asked whether or not Hitler would
order the defense of the pocket as in the case of Stalingrad.

Von Seydlitz answered in the affirmative, relying
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on Hitler's past decisions about holding land.

Shcher-

bakov then asked Seydlitz if he would help convince the
German troops within the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket to cease
fighting and save them the fate which befell Sixth Army
on the banks of the Volga.

Von Seydlitz agreed immedi-

ately and began to gather his assets behind the Russian
lines on the Dnieper River.~
Propaganda Against the Pocket
Von Seydlitz immediately contacted Colonel Steidle
and Major Buchler, who served as the representatives of
the League of German Officers with the Second Ukrainian
Front, telling them to act in his behalf. 16

Von Seydlitz

did his part in the propaganda campaign by addressing the
German soldiers over radio "Free Germany.

1117

Von Seydlitz broadcast the message that if the German soldiers surrendered that they would be treated well.
He promised that they would receive "the best treatment
possible" while in captivity.

The troops also received

the promise that the Russians would do anything humanly
possible to ease the lives of the troops during their
captivity and that they would be returned home after the
war.

The Russians demanded one condition, that the

troops surrender as whole units with their officers. 18
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Addressing the

ss

The Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket contained not only German troops, but troops from countries Germany conquered
earlier in the war.

Two of the

ss formations in the

pocket were made up of men from conquered countries.

The

Wiking Division contained men from Norway, Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The second SS for-

mation, the Wallonien Brigade, came solely from Belgium.
Leon Degrelle, of the Wallonien Brigade, described
the reasons many of the Freewilling Volunteers from Belgium, joined the SS:
We had left for the anti-Bolshevik crusade so
that the name of our mother country, besmirched
in May, 1940, would resound, glorious and honored, once more.
Soldiers of Europe, we wanted
our ancient country to rise again as brilliant
as before in the new Europe which was being so
painfully born. We were the men of the country
of Charlemagne, of the dukes of Burgundy, and
of Charles the Fifth. After twenty centuries
of soul-stirring radiance this country could
not be allowed to sink into mediocrity or oblivion."
Degrelle and his men hated the Russians and all they
stood for.

He saw Hitler, as the new hope for Europe

against the Russians and Bolshevism and still believed
that he could guarantee the safety of Europe, even as
late as 1944.w

His men were in high spirits as the Rus-

sians closed the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket.

But the Rus-

sians tried to break them of their hatred of Bolshevism
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and their love for Hitler.
The Russians directed a radio campaign solely against the Belgian volunteers of the Wallonien Brigade.
A powerful transmitter broadcast messages in "honeyed
French" describing the marvels of Stalin's regime.

The

speaker would then "charitably" inform the Belgians of
their situation telling them they had no hope.

The voice

would then invite the Belgians to join General DeGaulle,
the true hero of Europe, if they would approach the Russian lines carrying a white flag.

None of the Belgians

took the Russians up on this offer. 21
When the radio broadcasts failed, a Russian General
decided to take matters into his own hands.

He began his

own plan designed to strip Germany of her Freewilling
Volunteers of the Wallonien Brigade from Belgium.

ss

He

took the two Belgians he had captured earlier in the
fighting to close the pocket and "invited them to dine
with him."

He stuffed his "guests" with all the food he

could find, their meal included candied meats, bread,
wine, cakes and jellies.

He then gave the Belgians candy

and cigarettes to take back to their comrades and give
them his invitation to join him at his table. n
The two Belgians were driven back to a point opposite their lines and allowed to cross back into German
held territory.

The Belgians shared their candy and cig-
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arettes with their comrades and laughed with them about
the invitation the Russian General made to them.

The

Belgians loved the candy and cigarettes and dreamed of
sitting down to a table that their two freed comrades
described.

None of the Belgians took the General up on

his invitation though, leaving the Russian where they had
been before, with no deserters.

Degrelle says that the

General was very popular with his men (Degrelle's), "but
the hook was too visible under the bait for them to fall
for the invitation."n
The Leaflets Arrive
The Russians decided that their propaganda was
reaching too few men, so they printed up leaflets and
dropped them into the pocket.

The leaflets began drop-

ping into the pocket as early as February Tenth and continued until the night of the breakout.

The leaflets de-

scribed the desperate situation of the encircled men and
suggested that the only way to save themselves was to
join the Free Germany Committee. 24
This first leaflet told the purpose of the Free Germany Committee, who made up the committee and how to contact the committee should the troops within the pocket
wish to surrender.
There exists in Russia a powerful German freedom movement, which has taken as its task, the
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freeing of Germany from the tyranny of Hitler
and the opening of peace negotiations. Also
marching in this "Free Germany" movement is the
League of German Officers in Captivity under
the command of Artillery General Walther von
Seydlitz. The undersigned (Steidle and Buchler) are empowered as members of the League of
German Officers opposite your sector to make
contact with you. We have gone through the
hell of Stalingrad and therefore know your
misery. 25
At first, none of the officers within the pocket took the
leaflet seriously.

They knew that von Seydlitz had been

at Stalingrad, but were not aware of his fate.

At first

they believed the Russians had fabricated the whole organization (Free Germany Committee) . 26

The leaflets also

told the Germans within the pocket how to make contact
with the members of the Free Germany Committee, and promised their return after negotiations.
Come to us and take protection under the League
of German Officers. Make contact with us.
Send emissaries to us to whom we can give exact
instructions.
Each emissary should make himself recognizable at the front with a white
cloth and demand to speak with one of the undersigned officers. We guarantee every emissary an unhindered return to his unit. The Red
Army staff have appropriate instructions.v
No sources within the pocket, or even among the authors
writing from the Russian point of view, speak of any emissaries sent to the Russians to discuss surrender
terms. 28

The instructions spoken of in the leaflet, were

to escort the emissaries to the members of the League of

German Officers, and to return them to their lines when
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they wished to go. 29

The leaflets failed miserably to

provide the Russians with any deserters. 30

The represent-

atives of the League of German Officers at the front believed that the leaflets failed because they possessed so
few of them.

They complained that their message still

reached too few men of the pocket. 31
Along with the leaflets, the Russians began sending
German prisoners into the pocket under flags of truce.
The German prisoners carried letters addressed to the
German officers in the pocket.

The hand written letter

from General von Seydlitz proposed that the Germans in
the pocket surrender honorably to the Russians.

They

also carried pictures of the men that the Russians had
captured the day before.

The pictures showed the cap-

tured men sitting at a table with General von Seydlitz.
The captured men had food and their wounds were cleaned
and dressed.n
The German generals could not deny the authenticity
of the letters, or the fact that they came from General
von Seydlitz.

The letters contained too many facts that

only von Seydlitz could know."

The letters also served

to reinforce the Russian and Anglo-American news broadcasts they heard, telling them of the existence of the
National Committee for a Free Germany and the League of
German Officers in Captivity.~

The generals now knew
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that the Free Germany Committee and League of German Officers existed, but they did not know whether the promises they made about their captivity was true. 35

None of

the German officers in the pocket took von Seydlitz up on
his offer to surrender and join the Free Germany Committee.Y
On January 9, the Russians dispatched a lieutenant
colonel to the pocket to carry their demands for the unconditional surrender of the men within the pocket.

The

Russian officer arrived at the front of Corps Detachment
B with his driver and an interpreter.

The Germans treat-

ed the Russians to champagne and cigarettes, but offered
no reply to the demands he gave them. 37
On February 10, Colonel General Lieb received a letter from General von Seydlitz, that the Russians delivered by aircraft.

Lieb had served under von Seydlitz in

1940 and although he respected him he could not understand how von Seydlitz could serve Zhukov.

Lieb saw von

Seydlitz as serving as sort of a G-2 for Zhukov and although he believed that Stalingrad could have changed
him, he could still not understand von Seydlitz's motives
for helping the Russians.

Von Seydlitz implored Lieb to

act as Yorck acted during the campaign of 1812.

Von Sey-

dlitz wanted Lieb to "go over to the Russians with his
entire command."

Lieb decided not to answer von Sey-
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dlitz's demand, signifying his refusal by his silence. 38
The Russians dropped leaflets into the pocket on a
regular basis until February 10.

At eleven o'clock in

the morning of Friday, February 11, 1944, the Russian
commanders delivered a second ultimatum to Colonel General Stemmermann.

The Russians demanded that the Germans

surrender and promised to treat them as courageous soldiers, or they would unleash an attack at 1300 hours and
they would exterminate the Germans. 39
The Russian ultimatum stated that the troops within
the pocket had no hopes for rescue. 40

The ultimatum told

of the troubles the Germans were having even getting
started in their relief attempts and of the ability of
the Russians to keep the troops of Group Stemmermann enclosed within the pocket:
The units of the Red Army have enclosed this
Heeresgruppe in a firm ring. The encircling
ring will be drawn ever tighter. All of your
hopes of salvation are in vain. The German 3.,
11., 16., 17., and 24. Panzerdivisions which
were rushing to your aid, were smashed during
the attempt and their remnants encircled and
wiped out. 41
The Russians had told the truth about their ring around
Group Stemmermann.

The German troops of the relief ef-

fort could go no further and the ring around Group Stemmermann stayed intact.

The Russians did not know however

that the 24 Panzer Division had been turned over to Army
Group A.

The Russian message also failed to mention the
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First Panzer Division, the First SS Panzer Liebstandarte
Adolf Hitler, or Heavy Panzer Regiment Baeke. 42
Stemmermann instantly and categorically rejected the
ultimatum.

Colonel General Lieb and General Gille, the

two other German Generals present when the Russians delivered the ultimatum, were in total agreement with Colonel General Stemmermann.

The Russians reported to their

superiors, telling them that the Germans did not even
wish to discuss terms of surrender with them. 43
Fortunately for the German troops in the pocket, the
German High Command sent General Stemmermann their own
appraisal of the relief effort.

General Speidel sent

Stemmermann a more encouraging message:
Brieth's leading elements have reached Lissjanka. Vormann advancing from Jerki bridgehead
in direction of Swenigorodka. How is the situation there? All the best for a successful
outcome.~
Stemmermann could not allow himself to become too hopeful
about a relief effort breaking into the pocket though,
Four Russian tank armies and an elite cavalry corps stood
in the way of the relief attempts.~
The League of German Officers implored Stemmermann
to accept the Russian ultimatum.

The League drafted an-

other letter signed by three junior officers and sent it
into the pocket with German prisoners of war.

The note

reiterated the Russian views of the success of the relief
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attempts, and told of the consequences of rejecting the
ultimatum:
On behalf of Artillery General Walther von Seydlitz, President of the League of German Officers, we call on you most forcefully to under
all circumstances accept the ultimatum of the
Red Army and immediately cease all resistance.
Time is running out! Your situation is hopeless!
The Red Army's ultimatum is absolutely honourable since any further resistance has nothing
to do with soldierly fighting.
Or do you wish
to throw away your life senselessly for Hitler,
who has written you off long ago?
We fighters of Stalingrad know from our own experience what it means to reject a Russian ultimatum.
Only as a result of rejecting such an
ultimatum, which also followed Hitler's order,
an additional 120,000 men died at Stalingrad! 46
The letter went on to guarantee that the Russians would
treat the surrendering Germans well in captivity.

The

League promised to meet the surrendering soldiers and officers soon after they were taken prisoner.

The League

went on to promise that the men would be provided with
food and medicine directly after leaving the pocket. 47
on February 13, a message arrived at the headquarters of Colonel General Lieb, addressed to the commander
of the 198th Division.

The letter was attached, as

usual, to a red, black and white pennant (the colors of
the German flag).

The message demanded the surrender of

this division, with all the officers present at the time
of surrender.

Lieb found this message interesting for
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the fact that the 198th Division was not even in the
pocket.~
A Note to von Manstein
Since none of their efforts directed at the commanders within the pocket proved fruitful, Colonel General Seydlitz decided to address a letter to Field Marshal von Manstein.

He implored von Manstein to allow

Generals Lieb and Stemmermann to surrender their troops,
calling further resistance futile.
The encirclement and the destruction, at present under way, of ten divisions of your army
group one year after the catastrophe of Stalingrad is not only a military defeat, it is also
an incomprehensible and irresponsible sacrifice
of an irreplaceable part of our people.
I
know, my dear Field Marshal, that you are not a
faithful National Socialist. You are also not
one of the so-called "Party Generals.'' All the
service positions you have filled during the
war you received on the basis of your military
abilities. And that is also the reason why you
must surely see the over-all military picture
for what it is--Hopeless!
Even before this latest catastrophe you must
have known that the arc of the Dnieper front
was untenable, jutting out as it does--and you
did know it. But nevertheless bowed to Hitler's orders, the predictable results of which
were the senseless slaughter of tens of thousands of German soldiers.
The German people do not ask their military
commanders to continue a hopeless fight against
their better knowledge simply because an adventurer (Hitler) wants them to. The German
people expect and demand that the military commanders and that also includes you, my dear
Field Marshal have the courage and determin-
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ation to act according to their best knowledge
and conviction. 0
This attempt to make von Manstein order the surrender of
his troops also proved futile.

Von Manstein believed

that he had assembled a rescue force powerful enough to
break through to the lines of Group Stemmermann and wished to give his troops the chance to do so.so
Allaying the Fears of the SS
On February Ninth, a messenger delivered a letter to
General Gille, the top ranking SS officer in the pocket
and leader of the Wiking

ss

Division.

Major General Kor-

fes of the League of German Officers drafted this letter
on behalf of General von Seydlitz, designed to strip the
German troops of their SS comrades.
hoped to allay the fears of the

ss

With the letter, he
men in the pocket.

Your desperate hope, that a breakout with help
from the relief attack by the German forces
from the southwest will succeed is delusive.
General von Seydlitz gives you the assurance
that the National committee for a Free Germany
and the League of German Officers in Captivity
are in the position to have all proceedings
against you and your troops struck down.
Of
course this is on the condition that you and
your troops voluntarily lay down your weapons
and join the National Committee in its fight.
In the interests of protecting the lives of
your soldiers, it is your duty to agree to General von Seydlitz' suggestion.
I would add
that today many officers and soldiers of the
Waffen ss are already fighting in our ranks. st
The crimes talked about in the letter come from early in
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the war when Hitler issued an order that soldiers would
kill all the commissars they overran.
Waffen

The troops of the

ss followed Hitler's orders, while many regular

troops refused to kill the commissars in cold blood. 52
The letter went on to talk of other crimes the Russians
wished to try members of the

ss for:

At Hitler's orders, German soldiers destroy and
ravage .Russian cities and villages in the
course of evacuating them; the population is
being robbed and forcibly abducted to Germany.
In all this, units of the SS and Special commandos excel.n
The letter sent to General Gille tried to allay his fears
of Russian reprisals against his surrendering troops.
Gille refused to surrender because he doubted the power
of the League of German Officers to make good their promises to his men.

Along with his doubt, Gille refused to

surrender, because along with his troops and the other elite units of the Waffen SS, he felt a deep hatred towards the Russians.~
Some German Prisoners
While breaking out of the pocket, many men fell, too
exhausted to carry on.
with the wounded.

These men were taken prisoner,

Although the Russians did manage to

take 15,000 prisoners, these surrendered because of the
hardships of the escape attempt and not because of the
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work of the Free Germany Committee and the League of German Officers."

Many of these men carried the leaflets

from the Free Germany Committee and the passes that the
Russians issued guaranteeing them safe passage through
their lines.

These men were treated no differently than

any other German prisoners.

This fact caused many of the

Germans to believe that the Free Germany Committee and
the League of German Officers had been lying to them all
along.~
The Campaign Against the Men in the Lines
During the breakout a Fieseler Storch came to pick
up Colonel General Lieb, General Gille and Lieutenant Degrelle.

They flew to East Prussia, where Hitler congrat-

ulated them on their breakout and escape from the Russians.~

During their stay in Prussia, Lieb, Gille and

Degrelle were told of a Russian news release detailing
the liquidation of the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket.

The re-

lease stated that Lieb, Gille and Degrelle had deserted
their men and that only 2,000 to 3,000 men of the SS in
the spearhead of the breakout attempt had escaped. 58
After the breakout attempt succeeded, the Russians
tried to use their victory at Cherkassy-Korsun, to demoralize the Germans still in the front lines.

They

twisted the numbers of prisoners taken and of the losses
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in men the Germans suffered to try to turn the German
soldiers against their commanders and against Hitler. 59
The Russians claimed a great victory, similar to the
one they achieved at Stalingrad, during their liquidation
of the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket.

The Russian account of

the battle stated that the pocket contained over 88,000
men and that only around 3,000 men, mainly the officers
and lead elements of the

ss, escaped during the breakout

attempt. 60
The Russians publicized the fact that Colonel General Lieb, General Gill and Lieutenant Degrelle were rescued by plane during the relief attempt.

Since the Rus-

sians repudiate the German claims of a breakout, they
claim that the officers were flown out before the men of
Group Stemmermann reached the German lines and that the
officers deserted their men to their fates at the hands
of the Russians. 61
The Russians also made a great deal of the death of
Colonel General Stemmermann.

According to the Russian

sources, the Germans denied Stemmermann's death and
claimed that he was with them in Germany.

According to

the Russians, the German officers did not want their men
to know of Stemmermann's loss and wished to downplay
their losses in the battle. 62

Von Manstein admits to the

loss of Colonel General Stemmermann during the breakout

156

attempt.

He states that other than the loss of the

wounded that this was his only regret. 63

The Russians

wished to show that no matter what rank a German held,
that Hitler would let him sacrifice his life for him.M
Differing Stories
The German accounts claim that the pocket contained
between 54,000 to 56,000 men and that between 30,000 and
32,000 escaped. 65

Two factors contributed to the mistake

the Russians made in estimating the strength of the pocket.

The Russian mistakenly identified the groups within

the pocket and the strength of the formations involved.
At first, the Russians believed that they had trapped the entire Eighth Army and the army command element
within the pocket.

General Koniev, the commander of the

Third Russian Front, believed that the pocket contained
ten and a half divisions, mainly panzer divisions, with
over 100,000 men.~

The Russians found out the truth, la-

ter, that the pocket contained the German Forty-Second
and Eleventh Corps, but they claimed that in truth, the
pocket still numbered around 88,000.

The Russians ar-

rived at this number, because at full strength two corps
of eleven formations would number around 88,000 men. 67
But, the German corps within the pocket had been in the
front lines for months and according to all the German
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sources, were well below their full strength.

The German

claim that the pocket contained between 54,000 and 56,000
men can be proven by looking at the histories of the
groups encircled in the pocket and of the units taking
place in the relief attempts. 68
Field Marshal von Manstein claimed that the pocket
contained six and a half divisions. 69

He began with ten

divisions and a brigade in the area, but in order to preserve the fighting strength of his divisions, von Manstein had combined them into new forces as they became
too weak to exist on their own.

He combined the saar-

Palantine 112th Division, the Silesian 332nd Division and
the Saxon 225th Division under the command of the 112th
Division forming a unit called Corps Detachment B. 70
The Russians also overestimated the strength of the
pocket due to the fact that the pocket contained the remnants of many divisions.

The pocket contained part of

the Silesian 417th Grenadier Regiment, the Engineer Battalion of the 168th Infantry Division as well as the
331st Bavarian Regiment of the 167th Infantry Division.
The pocket also contained a battalion of the Silesian
213th Local Defence Division and the Ski Battalion of the
323rd Infantry Division.

Tanks of the 108 Panzer Regi-

ment of the 14th Panzer Division broke into the pocket
during the first few days of its existence.TI

After look-
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ing at what the pocket actually contained, the German
claim of 54,000 to 56,000 men seems more reasonable then
the Russian claim of 88,000 men.
Out of the 54,000 to 56,000 men in the pocket, the
Germans claimed that 30,000 to 32,000 men broke out of
the encirclement, 72 while the Russia~s claim only 3,000
men escaped. 73

By examining the number of survivors from

each group, the German claim comes closer to the truth.
The 105th regiment of the 72nd Infantry Division came out
of the pocket with three officers and 216 men, out of
1062 encircled.

General Gille of the Wiking Division

lead 4,500 men of his division out of the pocket, seventy
percent of his divisional strength when the Russians
formed the pocket.

General Trowitz led his Bavarian 57th

Infantry Division and the remains of the 389th Infantry
Division to freedom, bringing 3,000 men of the rear guard
out of the pocket.

Trowitz also brought 250 wounded men

out of the pocket with him, men Stemmermann had reluctantly ordered left in the pocket.

Lieutenant Leon De-

grelle, the leader of the Wallonien Brigade brought 632
of his Belgians out of the pocket, along with 3,000 other
men.~

The Russians claim that only one percent of the

men escaped. 75

This line of propaganda failed, because

the men in the lines were told the German version of the
truth by their officers.
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The Germans intercepted a radio transmission from
Moscow, released by the "Information Bureau":
In the course of the offensive at the beginning
of February from the area north of Kirowograd
in a westerly direction and from the area
southeast of Belaja-Zerkow in an easterly direction, the troops of the Second Ukrainian
Front and the First Ukrainian Front broke
through the strongly manned German defensive
zone and in daring and skillful maneuvers encircled a large group of German-fascist troops
north of the line Swenigorodka-Schpola.
As a result of this operation our troops have
surrounded: the German 11 Army Corps under
Generalleutnant Stemmermann and the German 42
Army Corps under General der Infanterie Mattenkloth.
The surrounded German Corps include:
the 112
Infantry Division of Generalmajor Lieb, Oberst
Barman's 88 Infantry Division, Generalmajor
Heine's 82 Infantry Division, Oberst Honn's 72
Infantry Division, Generalleutnant Traunberg's
167 Infantry Division, Generalmajor SchmidtHemmer's 168 Infantry Division, Generalmajor
Darlitz' 57 Infantry Division Generalleutnant
Geschen's 332 Infantry Division, the SS Panzer
Division Wiking under Brigadefuhrer Gille and
the SS Motorized Brigade Wallonien under Major
Lippert. The strength of the surrounded units
is 70-80,000 soldiers ....
The surrounded German units left 52,000 dead on
the battlefield, 11,000 men surrendered. The
Germans succeeded in removing scarcely more
than 2-3,000 officers from the number of surrounded German troops ....
During the same period 329 German aircraft, including 179 three-engine Ju-52 transport aircraft, more than 600 tanks and 374 guns were
destroyed.
Our troops captured 256 tanks, and
134 guns from the enemy. 76
The Russians broadcast this message across Europe, hoping
to force the Germans in the front lines to surrender.

160

Their hope proved fleeting, as no groups of Germans surrendered en masse to the Russians after these news releases.

The Russians did make many mistakes in their

newsreleases, misstating ranks, divisions involved and
the commanders of the groups, not to mention the number
of men in the pocket and amount of material lost.n
In order to hopefully further demoralize the Germans, the Russians released another excerpt about the
German defeat at Cherkassy:
As stated by the captured officers from the
surrounded units, following the failure of the
attempted relief of the German forces who were
in the "sack", Hitler gave another order demanding that the surrounded officers and men
sacrifice themselves in order to hold up the
Russian divisions for some time, since this was
ostensibly necessary in the interests of the
German Front. The mentioned order of Hitler's
contained a direct order for the surrounded
German officers and soldiers to commit suicide
if their situation became hopeless.
In addition the captured Germans stated that during
the last 3-4 days plenty of suicides were observed. On orders from German commanders
wounded officers and men were killed and burned. During the occupation of the villages of
Steblew and Schanderowka for example, our
troops discovered a large number of burned out
trucks which were filled with the corpses of
German soldiers and officers.n
Here again, the Russians wanted to show that Hitler sacrificed men for land.
fear of the

ss

They also tried to instill the

in the regular German troops, claiming

that they carried out the order to kill all the wounded.
According to one Russian source their men came across
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trucks full of burnt corpses.

The Russians could tell

that they were the German wounded because of the plaster
of paris on the limbs and torsos of the men.

The plaster

of paris would not burn in the fires, so they could tell
these men had been treated for their wounds before they
died.~
An Assessment of the Campaign
Throughout the existence of the pocket, the Russians
compared the German troops there to those at Stalingrad a
year earlier.

The Russians wanted to show that Hitler

felt that land was more important than the lives of his
soldiers and wanted to show the average German soldier
that they might meet the same fate as the German wounded
met at Stalingrad.

The Russians also claimed that the SS

troops were carrying out orders issued by Colonel General
Stemmermann to execute the wounded of the pocket, so that
none of them would fall into Russian hands. 80
Many factors explain the failure of the League of
German Officers in Captivity and the National Committee
for a Free Germany to convince the men of the CherkassyKorsun Pocket to surrender.

The members of the League of

German Officers blamed the officers within the pocket for
not allowing the men who wished to surrender to do so.
The League of German Officers interviewed the men cap-
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tured during the breakout who carried the leaflets and
the passes.

Some (perhaps with calculated opportunism)

admitted that only their officers prevented them from
surrendering. 81
Some of the members of the League of German Officers
admitted that their failure stemmed from the fact that
Russian captivity meant hardships and many times even
death.

The members of the League of German Officers knew

that some of the surrendering German troops would spend
time in special camps, where they would have to endure
bitter hardships in order to survive.~

The German troops

may not have known of the hardships of Russian captivity,
but they had witnessed many of their comrades put to
death as soon as the Russians captured them. 83
The League of German Officers believed that the men
in the pocket refused to surrender because they still believed in Hitler as a warlord.

The members of the League

believed that Germany had already lost the war and that
prolonged fighting would only prolong Germany's agony.M
The League believed they had to force the troops of the
Wehrmacht to give up this belief in Hitler.~
The campaign to demoralize the troops in the front
lines failed because, in order to work the German soldiers had to lose faith in their officers.

From the

beginning of training in the German Army, the soldier
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learns to respect and listen to his officer at all times,
if he wishes to survive.

The Free Germany Committee ad-

mitted that this line of propaganda ultimately had to
fail because it asked the German soldier to do something
that was unthinkable to him, go against the orders of his
officer.~
The Russians aimed part of their propaganda entirely
against the Belgians of the Wallonien Brigade.

The fact

that the Belgians continued fighting during the existence
of the pocket and the fact that they broke out with the
Germans shows the

measure of the Russian failure to

strip the Germans of their allies.

swiss newspapers car-

ried the story of the Cherkassy Pocket to the rest of
Europe and if it had been truly successful, would have
kept other non-Germans from joining the German cause.
According to Degrelle, the ss Division Wallonien crossed
the Belgian Dutch border.

Degrelle waited on the road

and surveyed the seventeen kilometer long armored column,
which he would lead back into Russia, only two months after the encirclement at Cherkassy.n
The Russian propaganda, at Cherkassy-Korsun, designed to cause the surrender of the German troops, to
strip Germany of the Freewilling volunteers of the ss
within the pocket and to demoralize the German troops in
the front lines, failed miserably.

Although the Russians
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managed to take 15,000 prisoners, these were mainly
wounded, or men too tired to fight their way back to the
German lines.

The morale of the Germans in the pocket

remained high, because they knew how close the relief attempts really came to succeeding.

The men in the pocket

hated the Russians and knew they would face a hard life
in captivity.

The two

ss

units in the pocket, the Wal-

lonien and the Wiking were part of the German elite and
hated the Russians even more than their German comrades
in the pocket.

The propaganda ultimately failed because

it contained mostly lies dreamed up by the Russians and
because the men of the pocket knew they would suffer
greater hardships at the hands of the Russians than if
they could hold out and try to make it safely back to the
German lines.

This was especially true for the men of

the SS, because the Russians usually showed them no mercy
when captured.

Russian prisoners had faced the same mis-

treatment at the hands of the
them during the war.

ss when they surrendered to

The men fighting in the front lines

did not fall the for the propaganda the Russians designed
to demoralize them.

No German troops surrendered en

masse directly after the encirclement at CherkassyKorsun.

The German troops never lost faith in their

officers, and fought to the end of the war.

CHAPTER VIII
DEEP BATTLE AND BROAD FRONT CONCEPTS
And the Russian Operation at Cherkassy-Korsun
Developing the Concepts
Before World War II, the Russian Army developed a
concept for penetrating enemy lines and then destroying
the surrounded armies which they called "deep battle".
This concept remained doctrine, until the Spanish Civil
War showed problems in attaining the goals the doctrine
set forth.

During the Cherkassy operation, the Russian

Generals involved in the operation found themselves in a
situation similar to the one described in the deep battle
doctrine.

But, the Russian Generals ignored the concepts

of deep battle.

General Koniev in particular expressed

great interest in destroying the pocket, before continuing operations against Army Group South.

The Germans of

Army Group South mounted a relief attempt to rescue the
men at Cherkassy
deavor.

and eventually succeeded in their en-

The Germans succeeded in rescuing their comrades

at Cherkassy mainly due to the influence of Stalin on the
decisions of the Russian commanders.
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In the 1920's and 1930's a group of Soviet officers
led by Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskii developed the concept of "Broad Front".

Tukhachevskii envisioned an at-

tack on the enemy's entire front, in order to expose the
weak points in the enemy defensive positions.

After

finding a weakness in the enemy lines, the attacking armies forced a breach in the defenses.

A "shock army"

then penetrated the breach and began attacks into the
flanks and rear of the enemy forces.

Broad front allowed

the commanders on the scene to make their own decisions
during the battle and gave them freedom to follow up the
attacks that they felt would provide the best results. 1
Upon testing his broad front theory, Tukhachevskii
realized that the attacks into the flanks and rear of the
enemy required a very strong force.

The strengthening of

the shock army required thinning out the units on the entire front.

Further, the strengthening of the shock army

demanded that the main axis of attack take place on a
narrow front and that the high command take more control
over the armies and objectives.

Tukhachevskii then went

on from this focused attack to develop the concept he
called "Deep Battle".
fantry, cavalry

This concept sought to employ in-

and mechanized divisions in concert with

aviation to decimate the rear areas of the enemy and
bring the war to a speedy conclusion. 2
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Tukhachevskii designed deep battle as a two part engagement.

First, a massed all arms attack would pene-

trated the defensive line of the enemy.

Upon rupturing

the front, armored units attacked targets of opportunity,
including reserve artillery, supply dumps and headquarters units.

The second phase of the operation called for

an attack by mobile units to outflank the enemy and to
penetrate deep into the operational zone of the enemy. 3
A close associate of Tukhachevskii, Marshal Vladimir
Triandifillov, took the second phase of deep battle one
step further and sought to define exactly what elements
would participate in the attack.

Triandifillov also

sought to coordinate the attacks of each service as they
penetrated the depths of the defenses of the enemy. 4
Triandifillov based the divisions of the shock group
on a field army consisting of:

four to five rifle corps

with attached artillery, four to five artillery divisions, sixteen to twenty mechanized artillery regiments
and eight to twelve tank battalions.

Ideally, an en-

gagement using a field army of this size, would last
thirty days.

The first phase of the operation called for

an advance of thirty to sixty kilometers in five to six
days.

This phase of the operation depended on quickness

and a violent attack to guarantee that the enemy not reform a cohesive front.

A reserve unit consisting of mo-
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bile artillery sought to break up any efforts of the enemy to re-establish their front line.

The next phase of

the operation would build on the successes of the first
operation and in eighteen to twenty days destroy the enemy formations to a depth of 150 to 200 kilometers. 5
Problems Develop
At the time Tukhachevskii developed this plan, Russia could not support an army in the field, of the size
this plan required. 6

In order to alleviate the trouble

with supplies, the High Command developed a three echeloned attack plan for the shock army.
formation penetrated the enemy line.

First, a mobile
The second echelon

consisted of an all arms attack on the enemy's exposed
flank.

The third echelon penetrated the enemy reserve

areas to prevent any counter attack.

The High Command

set a goal of a two-hundred mile penetration for the
three echeloned attack. 7
In 1931, the development of the deep battle concept
received a mortal blow.

Marshal Triandifillov, one of

the fathers of deep battle died in a plane crash on the
way to deliver a paper in the Kiev Military District.
The death of Triandifillov left Tukhachevskii to carry on
his work on deep battle alone.

He did have the help of

other generals who believed in the success the concept
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could bring, but he had lost one of the great tactical
minds in the Russian Army. 8
Publishing the Results
The efforts associated with defining the concept of
deep battle culminated in the Field Regulations Manual of
1936. 9

In this manual, Tukhachevskii finally defined ful-

ly, his plan "Deep Battle"

and presented it for the ap-

proval of his fellow officers.
First, a massed, echeloned attack on a narrow
front would rupture the defender's conventional
infantry-artillery-antitank defense. Artillery
and mortars suppress defending artillery and
especially defending antitank guns.
Tanks move
a few meters in front of the attacking infantry, just meters behind the artillery barrage, crushing wire, overrunning machine gun
posts, and reducing other centers of enemy resistance.
Once through the enemy lines, the
attacking tanks take advantage of local opportunities to penetrate and attack enemy reserves, artillery, headquarters and supply
dumps.
Not tied to the infantry advance, the
tanks take advantage of their speed to exploit
local opportunities. 10
The attack on the enemy lines consisted of using artillery to soften his defenses and then used tanks followed
by infantry to overrun his forward positions.

The manual

then went on to describe the operations the Soviets would
undertake while in the rear areas of the enemy.
'Mobile Groups' composed of cavalry, mechanized
formations, or both, would exploit their mobility advantage to outflank the enemy or develop
penetration in order to reach the enemy rear
areas.
The object: to attack the entire depth
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of the enemy defenses simultaneously, with
frontal attacks, long range artillery fires,
deep penetrations by mobile forces, and bombing
and parachute attacks of key points.
Smoke and
deception operations distract the enemy from
the real intentions of the attack. 11
Tukhachevskii believed in launching the attack with tanks
just after an artillery barrage to lessen the losses to
his armor.

The tanks would move in before the defenders

could recover to repel them.

The tanks, then loose in

the enemy rear areas would cause as much havoc as possible, destroying the ability of the enemy within the
sector of the attack to continue the battle. 12

Of his

plans to reduce the enemy on a narrow front, he wrote:
The impossibility of destroying the enemy's army at one blow with contemporary broad fronts
forces us to achieve this by a series of consecutive operations, combined by constant pursuit; this can replace the destructive engagement which was the best form of encounter in
previous armies. 13
Tukhachevskii saw that the tank and airplane had revolutionized modern warfare and that the massed infantry
attacks used during the first World War, had become obsolete.

Tukhachevskii envisioned a time when the Red Ar-

my would use a material and technical based army which
would permit a more effective method of achieving the army's goals, and not the fighting for each separate position, as had taken place in World War I.~
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The Death of Deep Battle
On June 12, 1937, before the Red Army instituted his
ideas, Stalin had Tukhachevskii put to death.

Stalin al-

so ordered the execution of eight of Tukhachevskii's high
ranking assistants and ordered that the rest of them go
to prison.

Stalin feared the commanders of the Red Army.

After his purge of the civilians, the Red Army stood as
the only possible hinderance to his power and represented
the largest group of possible conspirators against him.~
In all, Stalin executed or replaced over 500 of his commanders from the rank of marshal all the way down to the
officers at brigade level, replacing the officers with
men politically acceptable to him, replacements which
would prove disastrous in the first few years of the war
with the Germans. 16
Stalin replaced the experienced thinkers and planners of the Red Army with politically acceptable officers.

Some officers were promoted well above their pre-

vious levels of experience, causing disastrous effects on
unit development and tactics.n
Soon after the death of Tukhachevskii, his idea of
deep battle came to an end during the Spanish Civil War. 18
The Russians aided the Republican forces in the Spanish
Civil War, by providing them with tanks, aircraft and
military advisors.

General D. G. Pavlov, a tank expert,
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reported to Stalin on his assessment of the tank:

"The

tank can play no independent role on the battlefield
... the tank must be relegated to an infantry support
role.

1119

Without Tukhachevskii to def end the independent

role of the tank on the battlefield, Stalin put Pavlov's
recommendations into practice.

Pavlov chose to ignore

the problems with coordinating armies of different nationalities ·with different weapons and training.

He

chose to ignore the inherent problems in the Spanish army
and came down very hard on the new concept.

He knew lit-

tle of deep battle and chose to blame the problems on a
new theory. 20
By late 1939, the High Command reformed the massed
mechanized corps into fifteen separate divisions relegated to infantry support roles.

The reforming of the

divisions and change in roles for the armored elements of
the Soviet Army eliminated most of Tukhachevskii's plans
for deep battle.
Deep Battle Concepts Employed
Late in 1939, General Georgi Zhukov employed Marshal Tukhachevskii's theory of deep battle.

On May 20,

Japanese troops overwhelmed the Soviet forces at the
Khalkhin-Gol River along the Mongolian-Manchurian border.
After the initial success, the battle became indecisive,
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and served to expose very serious flaws in the command
and control structure of the Soviet forces. 21
To remedy the situation, Soviet forces were transferred to the theatre and the High Command placed Zhukov
in charge of the First Army Group.

Zhukov received rein-

forcements and launched a counterattack on August 20.
Zhukov attacked exactly according to the plan Tukhachevskii laid out in PU-36 and smashed the Japanese formations facing him between two assault groups.

Zhukov com-

pletely encircled the forces of the Japanese Sixth Army
by August 24.

He managed to contain this force until a

cease fire was declared on September 16.n
Even after the success Zhukov managed using the deep
battle doctrine, the Red Army High Command still would
not rescind their decision to reorganize the tank forces
and change their thoughts on deployment and battle.

The

Red Army tank forces remained tied to their role of infantry support.

But, even if the Red Army High Command

had decided to reinstate the deep battle doctrine, inherent problems in the army might still have stood in the
way of true success using the deep battle doctrine.

The

Red Army may not have been developed enough to carry out
the deep battle doctrine as Marshall Tukhachevskii envisioned.
The problems associated with the Red Army implemen-
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ting deep battle doctrine became apparent even before the
adoption of PU-36.

In . September of 1936, Colonel Giffard

le Q. Martel, Assistant Director of Mechanization at the
War Office in England witnessed an exercise involving elements of the Byelorussian Military District.

The sheer

number of troops and the massed material involved in the
exercises impressed Martel.
Martel chronicled the events he witnessed, but also
reported many obvious flaws in the Soviet plan.

He re-

ported his findings to the War Office
The Russian Army was still a bludgeon, quite
incapable of rapier work; it had the armoured
spikes put on the head of the bludgeon and
would strike a deadly blow when it landed; but
an active and well-equipped enemy should often
be able to avoid or counter the blow and would
at least inflict heavy damage on a clumsy opponent. n
Martel believed that the Soviet Union had become a potent
military force, but that the army needed many refinements
before the Red Army became a real military power.

Deep

battle came to an end after the death of Tukhachevskii
and under Stalin, the

Red Army implemented new programs

to carry it into the next decade, but never implemented a
plan to take the place of deep battle.
Deep Battle and Cherkassy-Korsun
The operation at Cherkassy in many ways resembled
the operation that Tukhachevskii described in deep bat-
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tle.

The Russians penetrated the German lines and man-

aged to keep their lines open to allow other groups to
enter the rear areas of two German corps.

But, the Rus-

sians failed to put the second phase of Tukhachevskii's
plan into effect.

The failure to put the second phase of

the deep battle operation into effect and the fact that
the Russian commanders chose to ignore some of the laws
of warfare contributed to the fact that the Germans escaped from the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket.
was at Cherkassy

Marshal Zhukov

and he had used the doctrine of deep

battle before to defeat the Japanese, but could not put
it into effect in the Cherkassy operation.

Although he

did not command all the troops involved in the operation,
he could have suggested how best to carry on the operations against the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket.
The first stage of deep battle calls for an initial
advance of sixty miles into the rear areas of the enemy.
At Cherkassy the Russians succeeded in advancing the initial sixty miles, but then a German counteroffensive almost succeeding in rescuing the trapped force.

A further

Russian offensive regained the lost territory and left
the Russians eighty miles in the German rear area.

But,

the Russians stopped after the first advance and chose to
eliminate the men in the pocket, instead of continuing
with the deep battle doctrine.
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Russian Mistakes
The decision on the part of General Koniev to eliminate the men in the pocket violated two of the laws of
warfare, the law of mass and the law of economy of force,
which directly correlate to each other.

The law of mass

dictates that a commander concentrate most of his forces
against the critical point.

The critical area in the

Cherkassy operation should have been aimed against Army
Group South, since it contained the most men and presented the biggest problem for the Russian generals.

Ar-

my Group South proved strong enough to carry out small
offensive operations during the Cherkassy operation due
to the limited number of men facing them.

According to

von Manstein, he was able to free the two corps for relief operations because the Russians suspended offensive
operations against his group while they sought to eliminate the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket.

The Russians should

have employed the law of mass against Army Group South,
while employing the law of economy of force against the
men of Group Stemmermann in the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket.
The law of economy of force goes hand in hand with that
of mass.

Economy of force means that while massing

troops for the critical attack, a commander leaves enough
of his troops in the non-critical part of the line to
hold it against an attack by his enemy.

The Russian
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commanders should have employed the law of economy of
force against the least dangerous of the German forces,
the men of Group Stemmermann, which they had already surrounded and cut off from supply on the ground, and had
proved to no longer be capable of offensive operations.
The second phase of deep battle calls for a second
advance to take the attacking armies 200 miles into the
enemy rear areas.

This second advance was to make sure

that the enemy could not mount an attack to retake the
land they had lost, and to reform a viable defense against them.

In the Cherkassy-Korsun operation though,

the Russians did not mount the second offensive against
the men of Army Group South.
By suspending offensive operations against Army
Group South, the Russians allowed the Germans to mount an
operation to free their trapped men.

Von Manstein claim-

ed that if the Russians had not suspended their operations, that he could not have freed up the troops from
his front to mount the relief attacks.

The Germans

mounted a relief attempt when the Russian attacks stopped
and man-aged to drive most of the eighty miles separating
them from Group Stemmermann and ended up being stopped by
the weather and the Russians within six miles of the
pocket.

The men of Group Stemmermann were then able to

drive the remaining six miles to the lines of Third Pan-
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zer Corps.

The first attack drove Army Group South back

only eighty miles, and the two separated groups proved
just strong enough to fight their way across the eighty
miles which separated them.
The Russian Generals made some poor decisions about
the conduct of operations at Cherkassy, but Stalin must
be held responsible for the strategic and timing decisions.

Stalin pushed his generals to eliminate the Cher-

kassy-Korsun Pocket to prove to the German soldiers that
Hitler cared about land, instead of them, hopefully causing some of them to desert from the German army.

Stalin

chose the objective of destroying this one group in hopes
of causing some desertions, when he could have commanded
his generals to keep up their attacks against Army Group
South.

The attack they launched to create the pocket had

already caused a gap between Army Group South and Army
Group Centre and caused a sixty mile gap in the lines of
Army Group South, where the men of Group Stemmermann had
been.

Further attacks had a good chance of rupturing the

front of Army Group South entirely.
Although
not

Marshall Zhukov was at Cherkassy, he did

implement the deep battle doctrine, even though he

had used the doctrine to defeat the Japanese years earlier.

The Russian generals did not obey the laws of war-

fare in their operation against the Cherkassy-Korsun
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Pocket.

Stalin chose to put non-military considerations

in front of military ones.

All these factors helped con-

tribute to the Russian failure to bring the Cherkassy operation to a successful end and to the partial German
success in the freeing of their troops trapped within the
Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket.
Cherkassy-Korsun can be shown as one of the prime
examples of what happens when politics dictates strategy
and tactics on the battlefield.

Politics can decide when

to fight a war, whether the war be conditional or unconditional and what weapons are used.

But, decisions af-

fecting the conduct of the army must be left up to the
commanders on the scene.

Both Stalin and Hitler chose to

allow political considerations to dictate what land to
hold and which group to destroy, against the better judgment of their generals.

Unfortunately for the German and

Russian armies during World War II, the leadership of the
respective countries did not follow these rules.
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